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Limit Order Book as a Market for Liquidity
We develop a dynamic model of an order-driven market populated by discretionary liquidity
traders. These traders diﬀer by their impatience and seek to minimize their trading costs by
optimally choosing between market and limit orders. We characterize the equilibrium order
placement strategies and the waiting times for limit orders. In equilibrium less patient traders
are likely to demand liquidity, more patient traders are more likely to provide it. We ﬁnd that the
resiliency of the limit order book increases with the proportion of patient traders and decreases
with the order arrival rate. Furthermore, the spread is negatively related to the proportion of
patient traders and the order arrival rate. We show that these ﬁndings yield testable predictions
on the relation between the trading intensity and the spread. Moreover, the model generates
predictions for time-series and cross-sectional variation in the optimal order-submission strategies.
Finally, we ﬁnd that imposing a minimum price variation improves the resiliency of a limit order
market. For this reason, reducing the minimum price variation does not necessarily reduce the
average spread in limit order markets.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The timing of trading needs is not synchronized across investors, yet trade execution requires
that the two sides trade simultaneously. Markets address this inherent problem in one of three
ways: call auctions, dealer markets, and limit order books. Call auctions require all participants
to either wait or trade ahead of their desired time; no one gets immediacy, unless by chance.
Dealer markets, on the contrary, provide immediacy to all at the same price, whether it is desired
or not. Finally, a limit order book allows investors to demand immediacy, or supply it, according
to their choice. The growing importance of order-driven markets in the world suggests that this
feature is valuable, which in turn implies that the time dimension of execution is more important
to some traders than to others.1 In this paper we explore this time dimension in a model of a
dynamic limit order book.
Limit and market orders constitute the core of any order-driven continuous trading system
such as the NYSE, London Stock Exchange, Euronext, and the ECNs, among others. A market
order guarantees an immediate execution at the best price available upon the order arrival. It
represents demand for the immediacy of execution. With a limit order, a trader can improve
the execution price relative to the market order price, but the execution is neither immediate,
nor certain. A limit order represents supply of immediacy to future traders. The optimal order
choice ultimately involves a trade-oﬀ between the cost of delayed execution and the cost of
immediacy. This trade-oﬀ was ﬁrst suggested by Demsetz (1968), who states (p.41): “Waiting
costs are relatively important for trading in organized markets, and would seem to dominate the
determination of spreads.” He argued that more aggressive limit orders would be submitted to
shorten the expected time-to-execution, driving the book dynamics.
Building on this idea, we study how traders’ impatience aﬀects order placement strategies,
bid-ask spread dynamics, and market resiliency. Harris (1990) identiﬁes resiliency as one of three
dimensions of market liquidity. He deﬁnes a liquid market as being (a) tight - small spreads;
(b) deep - large quantities; and (c) resilient - deviations of spreads from their competitive level
(due to liquidity demand shocks) are quickly corrected. The determinants of spreads and market
depth have been extensively analyzed. In contrast, market resiliency, an inherently dynamic
1Jain (2002) shows that in the late 1990’s 48% of the 139 stocks markets throughout the world are organized
as a pure limit order book, while another 14% are hybrid with the limit order book as the core engine.
1phenomenon, has received little attention in theoretical research.2 Our dynamic equilibrium
framework allows us to ﬁll this gap.
The model features buyers and sellers arriving sequentially. We assume that all these are
liquidity traders, who would like to buy/sell one unit regardless of the prevailing price. However,
traders diﬀer in terms of their cost of delaying execution: they are either patient, or impatient
(randomly assigned). Upon arrival, a trader decides to place a market or a limit order, conditional
on the state of the book, so as to minimize his total execution cost. In this framework, under
simplifying assumptions, we derive (i) the equilibrium order placement strategies, (ii) the expected
time-to-execution for limit orders, (iii) the stationary probability distribution of the spread, and
(iv) the transaction rate. In equilibrium, patient traders tend to provide liquidity to less patient
traders.
In the model, a string of market orders (a liquidity shock) enlarges the spread. Hence we
can meaningfully study the notion of market resiliency. We measure market resiliency by the
probability that the spread will reach the competitive level before the next transaction. We ﬁnd
that resiliency is maximal (the probability is 1), only if traders are similar in terms of their
waiting costs. Otherwise, a signiﬁcant proportion of transactions takes place at spreads higher
than the competitive level. Factors which induce traders to post more aggressive limit orders
make the market more resilient. For instance, other things equal, an increase in the proportion
of patient traders reduces the frequency of market orders and thereby lengthens the expected
time-to-execution of limit orders. Patient traders then submit more aggressive limit orders to
reduce their waiting times, in line with Demsetz’s (1968) intuition. Consequently, the spread
narrows more quickly, making the market more resilient, when the proportion of patient traders
increases. The same intuition implies that resiliency decreases in the order arrival rate, since the
cost of waiting declines and traders respond with less aggressive limit orders.
Interestingly the distribution of spreads depends on the composition of the trading population.
We ﬁnd that the distribution of spreads is skewed towards large spreads in markets dominated by
impatient traders because these markets are less resilient. It follows that the spreads are larger
2Some empirical papers (e.g. Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995), Coopejans, Domowitz and Madhavan (2002) or
DeGryse et al. (2001)) have analyzed market resiliency. Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) ﬁnd that liquidity demand
shocks, manifested by a sequence of market orders, raise the spread, but then it reverts to the competitive level as
liquidity suppliers place new orders within the prevailing quotes. DeGryse et al. (2001) provides a more detailed
analysis of this phenomenon.
2in markets dominated by impatient traders. For these markets, we show that reducing the tick
size can result in even larger spreads because it impairs market resiliency by enabling traders to
bid even less aggressively. Similarly we show that an increase in the arrival rate might result in
larger spreads because it lowers market resiliency.
These ﬁndings yield several predictions for the empirical research on limit order markets.3
In particular our model predicts a positive correlation between trading frequency and spreads,
controlling for the order arrival rate. It stems from the fact that both the spread and the
transaction rate are high when the proportion of impatient traders is large. The spread is large
because limit order traders submit less aggressive orders in markets dominated by impatient
traders. The transaction rate is large because impatient traders submit market orders. This line
of reasoning suggests that intraday variations in the proportion of patient traders may explain
intraday liquidity patterns in limit order markets. If traders become more impatient over the
course of the trading day, then spreads and trading frequency should increase, while limit order
aggressiveness should decline towards the end of the day. Whereas the ﬁrst two predictions are
consistent with the empirical ﬁndings, as far as we know the latter has not yet been tested.
Additional predictions are discussed in detail in Section 5.
Most of the models in the theoretical literature such as Glosten (1994), Chakravarty and
Holden (1995), Rock (1996), Seppi (1997), or Parlour and Seppi (2001) focus on the optimal
bidding strategies for limit order traders. These models are static; thus they cannot analyze the
determinants of market resiliency. Furthermore, these models do not analyze the choice between
market and limit orders. In particular they do not explicitly relate the choice between market
and limit orders of various degrees of aggressiveness to the level of waiting costs, as we do here.4
Parlour (1998) and Foucault (1999) study dynamic models.5 Parlour (1998) shows how the
3Empirical analyses of limit order markets include Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995), Handa and Schwartz (1996),
Harris and Hasbrouck (1996), Kavajecz (1999), Sandås (2000), Holliﬁeld, Miller and Sandås (2001), and Holliﬁeld,
Miller, Sandås and Slive (2002).
4In extant models, traders who submit limit orders may be seen as inﬁnitely patient, while those who submit
market orders may be seen as extremely impatient. We consider a less polar case.
5Several other approaches exist to modeling the limit order book: Angel (1994), Domowitz and Wang (1994),
and Harris (1995) study models with exogenous order ﬂow. Using queuing theory, Domowitz and Wang (1994)
analyze the stochastic properties of the book. Angel (1994) and Harris (1998) study how the optimal choice between
market and limit orders varies with market conditions such as the state of the book, and the order arrival rate. We
use more restrictive assumptions on the primitives of the model that enable us to endogenize the market conditions
3order placement decision is inﬂuenced by the depth available at the inside quotes. Foucault (1999)
analyzes the impact of the risk of being picked oﬀ and the risk of non execution on traders’ order
placement strategies. In neither of the models limit order traders bear waiting costs.6 Hence,
time-to-execution does not inﬂuence traders’ bidding strategies in these models, whereas it plays
a central role in our model. In fact, we are not aware of other theoretical papers in which prices
and time-to-execution for limit orders are jointly determined in equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives the
equilibrium of the limit order market and analyzes the determinants of market resiliency. In
Section 4 we explore the eﬀect of a change in tick size and a change in traders’ arrival rate
on measures of market quality. Section 5 discusses in details the empirical implications, and
Section 6 addresses robustness issues. Section 7 concludes. All proofs related to the model are
in Appendix A, while proofs related to the robustness section are relegated to Appendix B.
2M o d e l
2.1 Timing and Market Structure
Consider a continuous market for a single security, organized as a limit order book without
intermediaries. We assume that latent information about the security value determines the range
of admissible prices, but the transaction price itself is determined by traders who submit market
and limit orders. Speciﬁcally, at price A investors outside the model stand ready to sell an
unlimited amount of security; thus the supply at A is inﬁnitely elastic. Similarly, there exists an
inﬁnite demand for shares at price B (A>B>0).M o r e o v e r ,A and B are constant over time.
These assumptions assure that all the prices in the limit order book stay in the range [B,A].7
The goal of this model is to investigate price dynamics within this interval; these are determined
by the supply and demand of liquidity manifested by the optimal submission of limit and market
orders.
and the time-to-execution for limit orders.
6Parlour (1998) presents a two-period model: (i) the market day when trading takes place and (ii) the con-
sumption day when the security pays oﬀ and traders consume. In her model, traders have diﬀerent discount factors
between the two days, which aﬀect their utility of future consumption. However, traders’ utility does not depend
on their execution timing during the market day, i.e there is no cost of waiting.
7A similar assumption is used in Seppi (1997), and Parlour and Seppi (2001).
4Timing. This is an inﬁnite horizon model with a continuous time line. Traders arrive at
the market according to a Poisson process with parameter λ > 0: the number of traders arriving
during a time interval of length τ is distributed according to a Poiss o nd i s t r i b u t i o nw i t hp a r a m e t e r
λτ. As a result, the inter-arrival times are distributed exponentially, and the expected time
between arrivals is 1
λ.W e d e ﬁne the time elapsed between two consecutive trader arrivals as a
period.
Patient and Impatient Traders. Each trader arrives as either a buyer or a seller for one
share of security. Upon arrival, a trader observes the limit order book. Traders do not have the
option not to trade (as in Admati and Pﬂeiderer 1988), but they do have a discretion on which
type of order to submit. They can submit market orders to ensure an immediate trade at the best
quote available at that time. Alternatively, they can submit limit orders, which improve prices,
but delay the execution. We assume that all traders have a preference for a quicker execution,
all else being equal. Speciﬁcally, traders’ waiting costs are proportional to the time they have to
wait until completion of their transaction. Hence, agents face a trade-oﬀ between the execution
price and the time-to-execution. In contrast with Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) or Parlour (1998),
traders are not required to complete their trade by a ﬁxed deadline.
Both buyers and sellers can be of two types, which diﬀer by the magnitude of their waiting
costs. Type 1 traders - the patient type - incur an opportunity cost of δ1 p e ru n i to ft i m euntil
execution, while Type 2 traders - the impatient type - incur a cost of δ2 (δ2 ≥ δ1 ≥ 0).T h e
proportion of patient traders in the population is denoted by θ (1 > θ > 0). This proportion
remains constant over time, and the arrival process is independent of the type distribution.
Patient types represent, for example, an institution rebalancing its portfolio based on market-
wide considerations. In contrast, arbitrageurs or indexers, who try to mimic the return on a
particular index, are likely to be very impatient. Keim and Madhavan (1995) provide evidences
supporting this interpretation. They ﬁnd that indexers are much more likely to seek immediacy
and place market orders, than institutions trading on market-wide fundamentals, which in general
place limit orders. Brokers executing agency trades would also be impatient, since waiting may
result in a worse price for their clients, which could lead to claims of negligence or front-running.8
Trading Mechanism. All prices and spreads, but not waiting costs and traders’ valuations,
are placed on a discrete grid. The tick size is denoted by ∆.W ed e n o t eb ya and b the best ask
8We thank Pete Kyle for suggesting this example.
5and bid quotes (expressed in number of ticks) when a trader comes to the market. The spread
at that time is s ≡ a − b. Given the setup we know that a ≤ A, b ≥ B,a n ds ≤ K ≡ A − B.I t
is worth stressing that all these variables are expressed in terms of integer multiples of the tick
size. Sometimes we will consider variables expressed in monetary terms, rather than in number
of ticks. In this case, a superscript “m” indicates a variable expressed in monetary terms, e.g.
sm = s∆.9
Limit orders are stored in the limit order book and are executed in sequence according to
price priority (e.g. sell orders with the lowest oﬀer are executed ﬁrst). We make the following
simplifying assumptions about the market structure.
A.1: Each trader arrives only once, submits a market or a limit order and exits. Submitted
orders cannot be cancelled or modiﬁed.
A.2: Submitted limit orders must be price improving, i.e., narrow the spread by at least one
tick.
A.3: Buyers and sellers alternate with certainty, e.g. ﬁrst a buyer arrives, then a seller, then
a buyer, and so on. The ﬁrst trader is a buyer with probability 0.5.
Assumption A.1 implies that traders in the model do not adopt active trading strategies,
which may involve repeated submissions and cancellations. These active strategies require market
monitoring, which may be too costly.
Assumptions A.2 and A.3 are required to lower the complexity of the problem. A.2 implies
that limit order traders cannot queue at the same price (note however that they queue at diﬀerent
prices since limit orders do not drop out of the book). Assumption A.1, A.2 and A.3 together
imply that the expected waiting time function has a recursive structure. This structure enables us
to solve for the equilibria of the trading game by backward induction (see Section 3.1). Further-
more, these assumptions imply that the spread is the only state variable taken into account by
traders choosing their optimal order placement strategy. For all these reasons, these assumptions
allow us to identify the salient properties of our model in the simplest possible way. In Section
6 we demonstrate using examples that the main implications and the economic intuitions of the
9For instance s =4means that the spread is equal to 4 ticks. If the tick is equal to $0.125 then the corresponding
spread expressed in dollar is s
m =$ 0 .5. The model does not require time subscripts on variables; these are omitted
for brevity.
6model persist when these assumptions are relaxed. We also explain why full relaxation of these
assumptions increases the complexity of the problem in a way that precludes a general analytical
solution.
Order Placement Strategies. Let pbuyer and pseller be the prices paid by buyers and sellers,
respectively. A buyer can either pay the lowest ask a or submit a limit order which creates a new
spread of size j. In a similar way, a seller can either receive the largest bid b or submit a limit
order which creates a new spread of size j. This choice determines the execution price:
pbuyer = a − j; pseller = b + j with j ∈ {0,...,s− 1},
where j =0represents a market order. It is convenient to consider j (rather than pbuyer or pseller)
as the trader’s decision variable. For brevity, we say that a trader uses a “j-limit order”w h e n
he posts a limit order which creates a spread of size j (i.e. a spread of j ticks). The expected
time-to-execution of a j-limit order is denoted by T(j). Since the waiting costs are assumed to
be linear in waiting time, the expected waiting cost of a j-limit order is δiT(j), i ∈ {1,2}. As a
market order entails immediate execution, we set T(0) = 0.
We assume that traders are risk neutral. The expected proﬁto ft r a d e ri (i ∈ {1,2}) who
submits a j-limit order is:
Πi(j)=

   
   
Vbuyer − pbuyer∆ − δiT(j)=( Vbuyer − a∆)+j∆ − δiT(j) if i is a buyer
pseller∆ − Vseller − δiT(j)=( b∆ − Vseller)+j∆ − δiT(j) if i is a seller
where Vbuyer, Vseller are buyers’ and sellers’ valuations, respectively. To justify our classiﬁcation
to buyers and sellers, we assume that Vbuyer >A ∆,a n dVseller <B ∆. Expressions in parenthesis
represent proﬁts associated with market order submission. These proﬁts are determined by a
trader’s valuation and the best quotes in the market when he submits his market order. It is
immediate that the optimal order placement strategy of trader i (i ∈ {1,2}) when the spread has
size s solves the following optimization problem, for buyers and sellers alike:
max
j∈{0,...s−1}
πi(j) ≡ j∆ − δiT(j). (1)
Thus, an order placement strategy for a trader is a mapping that assigns a j-limit order,
j ∈ {0,...,s− 1}, to every possible spread s ∈ {1,...,K}. It determines which order to submit
given the size of the spread. We denote by oi(·) the order placement strategy of a trader with
7type i. If a trader is indiﬀerent between two limit orders with diﬀering prices, we assume that
he submits the limit order creating the larger spread. We will show that in equilibrium T(j) is
non-decreasing in j; thus, traders face the following trade-oﬀ: a better execution price (larger
value of j) can only be obtained at the cost of a larger expected waiting time.
Equilibrium Deﬁnition. A trader’s optimal strategy depends on future traders’ actions
since they determine his expected waiting time, T(·). Consequently a subgame perfect equilibrium
of the trading game is a pair of strategies, o∗
1(·) and o∗
2(·), such that the order prescribed by each
strategy for every possible spread solves (1) when the expected waiting time T(·) is computed
given that traders follow strategies o∗
1(·) and o∗
2(·). Naturally, the rules of the game, as well as
all the parameters, are assumed to be common knowledge.
2.2 Discussion
It is worth stressing that we abstract from the eﬀects of asymmetric information and information
aggregation. This is a marked departure from the “canonical model” in theoretical microstructure
literature, surveyed in Madhavan (2000), and requires some motivation.
In most market microstructure models, quotes are determined by agents who have no reason
to trade, and either trade for speculative reasons, or make money providing liquidity. For these
value-motivated traders, the risk of trading with a better-informed agent is a concern and aﬀects
the optimal order placement strategies. In contrast, in our model, traders have a non-information
motive for trading and arrive pre-committed to trade. The risk of adverse selection is not a major
issue for these liquidity traders. Rather, they determine their order placement strategy with a view
at minimizing their transaction cost and balance the cost of waiting against the cost of obtaining
i m m e d i a c yi ne x e c u t i o n . 10 The trade-oﬀ between the cost of immediate execution and the cost of
delayed execution may be relevant for value-motivated traders as well. However, it is diﬃcult to
solve dynamic models with asymmetric information among traders who can strategically choose
between market and limit orders. In fact we are not aware of any such dynamic models.11
10Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) and Harris (1998) also argue that optimal order placement strategies for liquidity
traders diﬀer from the value-motivated traders’ strategies.
11Chakravarty and Holden (1995) consider a single period model in which informed traders can choose between
market and limit orders. Glosten (1994) and Biais et al.(2000) consider limit order markets with asymmetric
information, but do not allow traders to choose between market and limit orders.
8The absence of asymmetric information implies that the frictions in our model (the bid-ask
spread and the waiting time) are entirely due to (i) the waiting costs and (ii) strategic rent-
seeking by patient traders. Frictions which are not caused by informational asymmetries appear
to be large in practice. For instance Huang and Stoll (1997) estimate that 88.8% of the bid-ask
spread on average is due to non-informational frictions (so called “order processing costs”). Other
empirical studies also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of adverse selection on the spread is small compared
to the eﬀect of order processing costs (e.g. George, Kaul and Nimalendran, 1991). Madhavan,
Richardson and Roomans (1997) report that the magnitudes of the adverse selection and order
processing costs are similar at the beginning of the trading day, but that order processing costs
are much larger towards the end of the day. Given this evidence, it is important to understand
the theory of price formation when frictions are not due to informational asymmetries.
3 Equilibrium Order Placement Strategies and Market Resiliency
In this section we characterize the equilibrium strategies for each type of trader. In this way, we
can study how spreads evolve in between transactions and analyze the determinants of market
resiliency. We identify three diﬀerent patterns for the dynamics of the bid-ask spread: (a) strongly
resilient,( b )resilient, and (c) weakly resilient. The pattern which is obtained depends on the
parameters which characterize the trading population: (i) the proportion of patient traders,
and (ii) the diﬀerence in waiting costs between patient and impatient traders. We also relate
traders’ bidding aggressiveness and the resulting stationary distribution of the spreads to these
parameters.
3.1 Expected Waiting Time
We ﬁrst derive the expected waiting time function T(j) for given order placement strategies. In
the next section, we analyze the equilibrium order placement strategies.
Suppose the trader arriving this period chooses a j-limit order. We denote by αk(j) the
probability that the next arriving trader, who will observe a spread of size j, responds with a
k-limit order, k ∈ {0,1,...,j−1}.12 Clearly αk(j) is determined by traders’ strategies. Lemma 1
provides a ﬁrst characterization of the expected waiting times which establishes a relation between
12Recall that k =0stands for a market order.
9the expected waiting time and the traders’ order placement strategies that are summarized by
α’s:
Lemma 1 : The expected waiting time for the execution of a j-limit order is:
• T(j)=1









if α0(j) > 0 and j ∈ {2,...,K− 1} ,
• T(j)=+ ∞ if α0(j)=0 and j ∈ {2,...,K− 1}.
Assumption A.2 implies that a trader who faces a one-tick spread must submit a market
order, thus the expected time-to-execution for a one-tick limit order is T(1) = 1
λ, i.e. the average
time between two arrivals. The expected waiting time of a j-limit order that is never executed
(i.e. such that α0(j)=0 ) is obviously inﬁnite. Thus T(j)=+ ∞ if α0(j)=0 .I fα0(j) > 0,t h e
lemma shows that the expected waiting time of a given limit order can be expressed as a function
of the expected waiting times of the orders which create a smaller spread. This means that the
expected waiting time function is recursive.
Thus we can solve the game by backward induction. To see this point, consider a trader
who arrives when the spread is s =2 . The trader has two choices: to submit a market order
or a one-tick limit order. The latter improves his execution price by one tick, but results in an
expected waiting time equal to T(1) = 1/λ. Choosing the best action for each type of trader, we
determine αk(2) (for k =0and k =1 ). If no trader submits a market order (i.e. α0(2) = 0),
the expected waiting time for a j-limit order with j ≥ 2 is inﬁnite (Lemma 1). It follows that no
spread larger than one tick can be observed in equilibrium. If some traders submit market orders
(i.e. α0(2) > 0) then we compute T(2) using the previous lemma. Next we proceed to s =3and
so forth. As we can solve the game by backward induction the equilibrium is unique.
The possibility of solving the game by backward induction tremendously simpliﬁes the analy-
sis. As we just explained it derives from the fact that the expected waiting time function has
a recursive structure. This recursive structure follows from our assumptions, in particular A.2
and A.3. Actually these assumptions yield a simple ordering of the queue of unﬁlled limit orders
(the book): a limit order trader cannot execute before traders who submit more competitive
spreads. Hence, intuitively, the waiting time of a j-limit order can be expressed as a function of
10the waiting times of limit orders which create a smaller spread. Although the ordering considered
in the paper may seem natural it will not hold if buyers and sellers arrive randomly. Consider for
instance a buyer who creates a spread of j ticks, which subsequently is improved by a seller who




<j ). Clearly, the buyer will execute before the seller if the next
trader is again a seller who submits a market order. Assumption A.3 rules out this case. Without
this assumption, the waiting time function is not recursive and characterizing the equilibrium is
far more complex. This point is discu s s e di nm o r ed e t a i li nS e c t i o n6 .
3.2 Equilibrium strategies
Recall that the payoﬀ obtained by a trader when he places a j-limit order is
πi(j) ≡ j∆ − δiT(j),
hence the payoﬀ of a market order is zero (since T(0) = 0). Thus, traders submit limit orders
only if price improvement (j∆) exceeds their waiting cost (δiT(j)). A trader who submits a limit
order expects to wait at least one period before the execution. As the average duration of a
period is 1
λ, the smallest expected waiting cost for a trader with type i is δi
λ. It follows that the
smallest spread trader i can establish is the smallest integer jR




Let dxe denote the ceiling function - the smallest integer larger than or equal to x (e.g. d2.4e =3 ,







i ∈ {1,2}. (2)
We refer to jR
i as the trader’s “reservation spread”. By construction, this is the smallest spread
trader i is willing to establish with a limit order, such that the associated expected proﬁt
dominates submitting a market order. To exclude the degenerate cases in which no trader submits
limit orders, we assume that
jR
1 <K . (3)
We will sometimes refer to the patient traders’ reservation spread as the competitive spread
since traders will never quote spreads smaller than that. Clearly, the reservation spread of a
patient trader cannot exceed that of an impatient one, but the two can be equal. We say that the





It turns out that the dynamics of the spread are quite diﬀerent when traders are indistinguishable
(the homogeneous case) and when they are not (the heterogeneous case).
113.2.1 The Homogeneous Case - Traders are Indistinguishable
By deﬁnition of the reservation spread, all trader types prefer to submit a market order when the
spread is less than or equal to jR, which implies that the expected waiting time for a jR- limit
order is just one period. Hence
πi(jR) ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1,2}. (4)
Consequently, all trader types prefer a jR- limit order to a market order when the spread is
strictly larger than the traders’ reservation spread. Hence the expected waiting time of a j-limit
order with j>j R is inﬁnite (α0(j)=0 ). It follows that to ensure execution all traders submit
a jR- limit order when the spread is strictly larger than the reservation spread. This reasoning
yields Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 :L e ts be the spread, and suppose traders’ types are indistinguishable (jR
1 =
jR
2 = jR). Then, in equilibrium all traders submit a market order if s ≤ jR and submit a jR-limit
order if s>j R.
The equilibrium with indistinguishable traders has two interesting properties. First, the
outcome is competitive since limit order traders always post their reservation spread. We will
show below that this is not the case when traders have diﬀerent reservation spreads. Second, the
spread oscillates between K and jR, and transactions take place only when the spread is small.
Trade prices are either A−jR if the ﬁrst trader is a buyer, or B+jR,i ft h eﬁrst trader is a seller.
We refer to this market as strongly resilient, since any deviation from the competitive spread is
immediately corrected by the next trader.
We claim that while the dynamics of the bid-ask spread in the homogeneous case look quite
unusual, they are not unrealistic. Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) identify several typical patterns
for the dynamics of the bid-ask spread in the Paris Bourse. Interestingly, they identify precisely
the pattern we obtain when traders are indistinguishable (Figure 3B, p.1681): the spread alter-
nates between a large and a small size and all transactions take place when the spread is small.
Given that this case requires that all traders have identical reservation spreads, we anticipate
that this pattern is not frequent. It does, however, provide a useful benchmark for the results
obtained in the heterogeneous trader case.
123.2.2 The Heterogeneous Case
Now we turn to the case in which traders are heterogeneous: jR
1 <j R
2 . In this case, there are
spreads above patient traders’ reservation spread for which impatient traders will ﬁnd it optimal
to submit market orders. Let us denote by hj1,j 2i the set: {j1,j 1 +1 ,j 1 +2 ,...,j 2},i . e . ,t h es e t
of all possible spreads between any two spreads j1 <j 2 (inclusive). Then:
Proposition 2 : Suppose traders are heterogeneous (jR
1 <j R
2 ). In equilibrium there exists a
cutoﬀ spread sc ∈ hjR
2 ,Ki such that:
1. Facing a spread s ∈ h1,jR
1 i, both patient and impatient traders submit a market order.
2. Facing a spread s ∈ hjR
1 +1 ,s ci, a patient trader submits a limit order and an impatient
trader submits a market order.
3. Facing a spread s ∈ hsc +1 ,Ki, both patient and impatient traders submit limit orders.
The proposition shows that when jR
1 <j R
2 , the state variable s (the spread) is partitioned
into three regions: (i) s ≤ jR
1 , (ii) jR
1 <s≤ sc and (iii) s>s c. The reservation spread of the
patient trader, jR
1 , represents the smallest spread observed in the market. At the other end sc
is the largest quoted spread in the market. Limit orders that would create a larger spread have
an inﬁnite waiting time since no trader submits a market order when the spread is larger than
sc. Hence, such limit orders are never submitted. Impatient traders always demand liquidity
(submit market orders) for spreads below sc, while patient traders supply liquidity (submit limit
orders) for spreads above their reservation spread, and demand liquidity for spreads smaller than
or equal to their reservation spread.
Notice that the cases in which sc <Kand the case in which sc = K are qualitatively
similar. The only diﬀerence lies in the fact that the spread for which traders start submitting
market orders is smaller than K in the former case. This observation permits us to restrict our
attention to cases where sc = K. This restriction has no impact on the results, but shortens
the presentation. It is satisﬁed for instance when the cost of waiting for an impatient trader is
suﬃciently large.13
13Obviously sc = K if j
R
2 ≥ K. It is worth stressing that this condition is suﬃcient, but not necessary. In all the
numerical examples below, j
R
2 is much smaller than K, but we checked that sc = K.
13Proposition 3 :S u p p o s esc = K. Any equilibrium exhibits the following structure: there exist q
spreads (K ≥ q ≥ 2), n1 <n 2 <. . .<n q,w i t hn1 = jR
1 ,a n dnq = K, such that the optimal order
submission strategy is as follows:
• An impatient trader submits a market order, for any spread in h1,Ki.
• A patient trader submits a market order when he faces a spread in h1,n 1i, and submits an
nh-limit order when he faces a spread in hnh +1 ,n h+1i for h =1 ,...,q− 1.
Thus when a patient trader faces a spread nh+1 (h ≥ 1), he responds by submitting a limit
order which improves the spread by (nh+1 −nh) ticks. This order establishes a new spread equal
to nh. This process continues until a market order arrives. Let r ≡ θ
1−θ be the ratio of the
proportion of patient traders to the proportion of impatient traders. Intuitively, when this ratio
is smaller (larger) than 1, liquidity is consumed more (less) quickly than it is supplied since
impatient traders submit market orders and patient traders tend to submit limit orders. The
next proposition relates the expected waiting time for a limit order to the ratio r.













∀ h =2 ,...,q− 1; (5)
and
T(j)=T(nh) ∀ j ∈ hnh−1 +1 ,n hi ∀ h =1 ,...,q− 1.
Recall that a limit order cannot be executed before limit orders creating lower spreads. For
this reason, the choice of a spread is tantamount to the choice of a priority level in a waiting
line: the smaller is the spread chosen by a trader, the higher is his priority level in the queue of
unﬁlled limit orders. This explains why the expected waiting time function (weakly) increases
with the spread chosen by a trader. This propertyi sc o n s i s t e n tw i t he v i d e n c ei nL o ,M c K i n l e y ,
and Zhang (2001) who ﬁnd that the time to execution of limit orders increases in the distance
between the limit order price and the mid-quote.
T h el a s tp r o p o s i t i o nc a nb eu s e dt od erive the equilibrium spreads, n1,n2,...,nq, in terms of
the model parameters. Consider a trader who arrives in the market when the spread is nh+1
14We set n0 =0by convention.
14(h ≤ q − 1). In equilibrium this trader submits an nh-limit order. He could reduce his time to
execution by submitting an nh−1-limit order, but chooses not to. Thus the following condition
must be satisﬁed:
nh∆ − T(nh)δ1 ≥ nh−1∆ − T(nh−1)δ1, ∀h ∈ {2,...,q− 1},
or
Ψh ≡ nh − nh−1 ≥ [T(nh) − T(nh−1)]
δ1
∆
, ∀h ∈ {2,...,q− 1}. (6)
Now consider a trader who arrives in the market when the spread is nh. In equilibrium this
trader submits an nh−1-limit order. Thus, he must prefer this limit order to a limit order which
creates a spread of (nh − 1) ticks, which imposes
nh−1∆ − T(nh−1)δ1 > (nh − 1)∆ − T(nh − 1)δ1 ∀h ∈ {2,...,q};
thus
Ψh < [T(nh) − T(nh−1)]
δ1
∆
+1 ∀h ∈ {2,...,q}. (7)












,∀h ∈ {2,...,q− 1}, (8)
where the last equality follows from Proposition 4. We refer to Ψh as the spread improvement,
when the spread is equal to nh. It determines the aggressiveness of the submitted limit order:
the larger is the spread improvement, the more aggressive is the limit order.





, obtained by the trader who improves upon spread nh to the cost of
this reduction in terms of price concession, Ψh. In equilibrium, the price concession equals the
reduction in waiting cost rounded up to the nearest integer, because traders’ choices of prices are
constrained by the tick size. The next proposition follows from equation (8) and is central for
the rest of the paper.
Proposition 5 : The set of equilibrium spreads is given by:
n1 = jR
1 ; nq = K,
nh = n1 +
h X
k=2













Ψk ≥ K. (9)
Proposition 5 characterizes the amount by which traders outbid or undercut posted quotes
for each possible spread. For a given tick size, spread improvements, Ψ, are larger when (i) the
proportion of patient traders, θ, is large, (ii) the waiting cost, δ1 is large and (iii) the order
arrival rate, λ, is small. In particular, whenever 2δ1( θ
1−θ)h−1 > λ∆, a patient trader improves
the spread by more than one tick (Ψh > 1). Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) and Harris and
Hasbrouck (1996) ﬁnd that many limit orders in the Paris Bourse, and the NYSE (respectively)
improve upon the prevailing bid-ask quotes by more than one tick.
The intuition for these ﬁndings is as follows. Consider an increase in the proportion of patient
traders, which immediately reduces the execution rate for limit orders since market orders become
less frequent. This increases the expected waiting time (T) and, thereby, the expected waiting
cost (δ1T) for liquidity suppliers. To oﬀset this eﬀect, patient traders react by submitting more
aggressive orders (Ψh increases, ∀h>1). The same type of reasoning applies when λ decreases
or δ1 increases.
Clearly, the spread narrows more quickly between transactions when traders improve upon
the bid-ask spread by a large amount. For this reason, the parameters which increase (lower)
spread improvements, have a positive (negative) eﬀect on the resiliency of the limit order book. In
order to formalize this intuition, we need to measure market resiliency. We measure it by R,t h e
probability that the spread will reach the competitive level (jR
1 ) before the next transaction, when
the current spread is K. When traders are homogeneous, any deviation from the competitive
spread is immediately corrected and R =1 . When traders are heterogeneous, Proposition 3
implies that it takes a streak of q − 1 consecutive patient traders to narrow the spread down to
the competitive level when the spread is initially equal to K ticks. Thus R = θq−1 when traders
are heterogeneous.
Notice that q is endogenous and is a function of all the exogenous parameters (see Equation
(9)). Thus the resiliency of the market is determined by the proportion of patient traders, the
order arrival rate, trader’s waiting costs and the tick size.
16Corollary 1 : When traders are heterogeneous, the resiliency (R) of the limit order book in-
creases in the proportion of patient traders, θ, and the waiting cost, δ1, but decreases in the order
arrival rate, λ.
Intuitively, when the proportion of patient traders increases, or when waiting costs increase,
patient traders become more aggressive, and resiliency increases. An increase in the arrival rate
induces patient traders to become less aggressive in their price improvements, hence resiliency is
diminished. The eﬀect of the tick size on market resiliency will be analyzed in Section 4. The
model suggests that time-series and cross-sectional variations in the resiliency of the limit order
book are mainly due to variations in the proportion of patient traders, and to variations in the
order arrival rate. This yields several empirical implications which are discussed in Section 5. In
the rest of this section, we explore the relation between the dynamics of the bid-ask spread and
the proportion of patient traders.
3.3 Examples
Our purpose here is to illustrate, using numerical examples, that the dynamics of the book
are markedly diﬀerent in the following 3 cases: (a) traders are homogeneous, (b) traders are
heterogeneous and r ≥ 1, and (c) traders are heterogeneous and r<1. The numerical examples
also help to understand the propositions that we derived in the previous section. In all the
examples, the tick size is ∆ =$ 0 .125, and the arrival rate is λ =1 . The lower price bound of the
book is set to B∆ = $20, and the upper bound is set to A∆ = $22.5. Thus, the maximal spread
is K =2 0(K∆ =$ 2 .5). The parameters that diﬀer across the examples are presented in Table
1.
Table 1: Three Examples
Example 1 Example 2 Example 3
δ1 0.15 0.10 0.10
δ2 0.20 0.25 0.25
θ Any value 0.55 0.45
λ 111
Table 2 presents the equilibrium strategies for patient (Type 1) and impatient (Type 2) traders
in each example. Each entry in the table presents the equilibrium limit order (in terms of ticks,
17where 0 stands for a market order) given the current spread.15
Order Placement Strategies
Table 2 reveals the qualitative diﬀerences between the three examples. In Example 1, jR
1 =
jR
2 =2 ; thus patient and impatient traders are indistinguishable. The spread oscillates be-
tween the maximal spread of 20 ticks and the reservation spread of 2 ticks. In Examples 2
and 3, the traders are heterogeneous since jR
1 =1and jR
2 =3 . In Example 2, the spreads
on the equilibrium path are (in terms of ticks): {1,3,6,9,13,18,20}. Any other spread will
not be observed.16 In Example 3, the spreads on the equilibrium path are (in terms of ticks):
{1,3,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,16,17,18,19,20}. In these two examples, transactions can take
place at spreads which are strictly larger than the patient traders’ reservation spreads. However,
traders place much more aggressive limit orders in Example 2, where r>1. In fact, spread
improvements are larger than one tick for all spreads on the equilibrium path in this case. In
contrast, in Example 3, spread improvements are equal to one tick in most cases.
Expected Waiting Time
The expected waiting time function in Examples 2 and 3 is illustrated in Figure 1, which
presents the expected waiting time of a limit order as a function of the spread it creates. In
both examples the expected waiting time increases when we move from one reached spread to
the next, while it remains constant over the spreads that are not reached in equilibrium. The
expected waiting time is smaller at any spread in Example 3. This explains the diﬀerences in
bidding strategies in Examples 2 and 3. When r<1, patient traders are less aggressive because
they expect a faster execution.
Book Dynamics and Resiliency
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the limit order book over 40 trader arrivals. We use the
same realizations for traders’ types in Examples 2 and 3 and look at the dynamics of the best
quotes. Initially the spread is equal to K =2 0ticks. This may be the situation of the book,
for instance, after the arrival of several market orders. How fast does the spread revert to the
competitive level?
15The equilibrium strategies in Examples 2 and 3 follow from the formulae given in Proposition 5.
16To fully specify the equilibrium strategy, Table 2 presents the optimal actions for spreads on and oﬀ the
equilibrium path.
18Table 2 - Equilibrium Order Placement Strategies
Current Example 1 Example 2 Example 3











1 12290 1 0 0
1 22290 1 1 0
1 32290 1 2 0
14 2 2 13 0 13 0
15 2 2 13 0 14 0
16 2 2 13 0 15 0
17 2 2 13 0 16 0
18 2 2 13 0 17 0
19 2 2 18 0 18 0
20 2 2 18 0 19 0
In both examples, the competitive spread (i.e., patient traders’ reservation spread) is 1 tick
and can be posted in equilibrium (see Table 2). However, as is apparent from Figure 2, the
competitive spread is reached much more quickly in Example 2 than in Example 3. In fact, in
Example 3, the quoted spread remains much larger than the competitive spread during all 40
periods depicted in Figure 2. In contrast, in Example 2, the competitive spread is sometimes
posted and the spread is frequently close to the competitive spread. Since the type realizations
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Figure 1: Expected Waiting Time
use more aggressive limit orders in order to speed up execution.17 This bidding behavior explains
why the market appears much more resilient in Example 2 than in Example 3. Our measure
indicates that the resiliency of the market is much larger in Example 2, R =0 .556 ' 0.02,t h a n
in Example 3, where R =0 .4517 ' 1.27 × 10−6.
Summary: When traders are homogeneous, any deviation from the competitive spread
is immediately corrected. This is not the case in general when traders are heterogeneous. In
the latter case, the market is more resilient when r ≥ 1 than when r<1. Thus, although the
equilibrium of the limit order market is unique, three patterns for the dynamics of the spread
emerge: (a) strongly resilient, when traders are homogeneous, (b) resilient, when traders are
heterogeneous and r ≥ 1 and (c) weakly resilient, when traders are heterogeneous and r<1.
17If type realizations were not held constant, an additional force would make small spreads more frequent when
r ≥ 1. In this case, the liquidity oﬀered by the book is consumed less rapidly, since the likelihood of a market order
is smaller than when r<1. Thus the inside spread has more time to narrow between market order arrivals.
20Figure 2 - Book Simulation (same realizations of type arrivals for two examples)
Example 2 - Intense competition among liquidity suppliers ( r = 1.222)
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
Trader B2 S1 B1 S2 B2 S2 B1 S1 B2 S1 B2 S1 B1 S1 B2 S1 B1 S1 B1 S2 B1 S1 B1 S1 B2 S2 B1 S2 B1 S1 B1 S2 B2 S1 B2 S2 B2 S1 B1 S2
22 1/2 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
22 3/8
22 1/4 s s s
22 1/8
22
21 7/8 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
21 3/4
21 5/8
21 1/2 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
21 3/8
21 1/4 s s s s
21 1/8 b b b b b b b b b b b b
21
20 7/8




20 1/4 b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b
20 1/8
20 b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b
Example 3 - Low level of competition among liquidity suppliers ( r = 0.818 )
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
Trader B2 S1 B1 S2 B2 S2 B1 S1 B2 S1 B2 S1 B1 S1 B2 S1 B1 S1 B1 S2 B1 S1 B1 S1 B2 S2 B1 S2 B1 S1 B1 S2 B2 S1 B2 S2 B2 S1 B1 S2
22 1/2 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
22 3/8 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
22 1/4 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
22 1/8 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
22 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s










20 5/8 b b b b b b b b b b b b
20 1/2 b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b
20 3/8 b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b
20 1/4 b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b
20 1/8 b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b
20 b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b
Legend:
B1 - Patient buyer, B2 - Impatient buyer, S1 - Patient seller, S2 - Impatient seller
b - a buyers limit order, s - a sellers limit order.3.4 Distribution of Spreads
In this section, we derive the probability distribution of the spread induced by equilibrium order
placement strategies. We exclusively focus on the case in which traders are heterogeneous since
this is the only case in which transactions can take place at spreads diﬀerent from the competitive
spread. We show that the distribution of spreads depends on the composition of the trading
population: small spreads are more frequent when r ≥ 1 than r<1.T h i sr e ﬂects the fact that
markets dominated by patient traders (r ≥ 1) are more resilient than markets dominated by
impatient traders (r<1).
From Proposition 3 we know that the spread can take q diﬀerent values: n1 <n 2 <. . .<n q
in equilibrium. A patient trader submits an nh−1-limit order when the spread is nh (h =2 ,...,q)
and a market order when he faces a spread of n1. An impatient trader always submits a market
order (we maintain the assumption that sc = K) .T h u s ,i ft h es p r e a di snh (h =2 ,...,q− 1) the
probability that the next observed spread will be nh−1 is θ, and the probability that it will be
nh+1 is 1 − θ.I f t h e s p r e a d i s n1 all the traders submit market orders and the next observed
spread will be n2 with certainty. If the spread is K then it remains unchanged with probability
1−θ (a market order), or decreases to nq−1 with probability θ (a limit order). Hence, the spread
is a ﬁnite Markov chain with q ≥ 2 states. The q × q transition matrix of this Markov chain,
denoted by W, is:
W =





θ 01 − θ ··· 00






000 ··· 01 − θ
000 ··· θ 1 − θ

         
  

The jth entry in the hth row of this matrix gives the probability that the size of the spread
becomes nj conditional on the spread having size nh (j,h =1 ,...,q). The long-run probability
distribution of the spread is given by the stationary probability distribution of this Markov
chain.18 We denote the stationary probabilities by u1,...u q,w h e r euh is the probability of a
























Figure 3: Equilibrium Spread Distribution










i=2 θq−i(1 − θ)i−2 h =2 ,...,q. (11)
Figure 3 depicts the stationary distribution in Examples 2 and 3. Clearly, the distribution
of spreads is skewed toward higher spreads in Example 3 (r<1) and toward lower spreads in
Example 2 (r>1). This observation stems from the expressions for the stationary probabilities.











which yields the following corollary.
Corollary 2 : For a given tick size and waiting costs:
1. If r<1, uh >u h0 for 1 ≤ h0 <h≤ q. Thus, the distribution of spreads is skewed towards
higher spreads when r<1.
232. If r>1, uh <u h0 for 2 ≤ h0 <h≤ q.19 Thus, the distribution of spreads is skewed towards
lower spreads when r>1.






The smaller is the expected dollar spread, the more distant are transaction prices from the
“boundaries” A and B. Thus, smaller bid-ask spreads are associated with higher proﬁts to
liquidity demanders (the impatient traders), since their market orders meet more advantageous
prices. Using Equation (12), we ﬁnd that the expected spread in Example 2 (r>1)i ss m a l l e r
than in Example 3 (r<1)( $1.05 vs. $2).
4 Tick Size, Arrival Rate, and Waiting Cost
In this section we explore the comparative statics with respect to three parameters: tick size,
traders’ arrival rate, and traders’ waiting cost. In our model equilibrium spreads are determined
by the ratio δ1
λ (see Propositions 1 and 5). For this reason the results on an increase in the
arrival rate translate immediately to results on a decrease in the waiting costs δ1.T h u sw eo n l y
analyze the eﬀect of the order arrival rate to save space. For the same reason we restrict our
attention to cases in which traders have diﬀerent reservation spreads, i.e. jR
1 <j R
2 . We maintain
our assumption that sc = K, so that impatient traders always choose market orders.
4.1 Tick Size and Resiliency
The tick size (the minimum price variation) has been reduced in many markets in recent years.
In this section we examine the eﬀect of a change in the tick size in our model. We assume
throughout that such a change does not aﬀect the fundamentals of the security, hence it does not
19The inequality, uh <u h0, does not necessarily hold for h
0 =1 , when r>1. Actually the smallest inside spread
can only be reached from higher spreads, while other spreads can be reached from both directions (nq = K can
be reached either from nq−1 or from nq itself). This implies that the probability of observing the smallest possible
spread is relatively small for all values of r.




24change the monetary boundaries Am = A∆ and Bm = B∆. This means that Km = K∆ is ﬁxed
independently of the value of the tick size.
It has often been argued that a decrease in the tick size would reduce the average dollar
spread. We show below that this claim does not necessarily hold true in our model, because a
reduction in the tick size tends to impair market resiliency.21 We demonstrate that imposing a
positive tick size in a weakly resilient market tends to enhance resiliency and consequently lower
the expected spread.
To better convey the intuition, it is useful to consider the polar case in which there is no
minimum price variation (i.e., ∆ =0 ). In this case prices and spreads must be expressed in
monetary terms. Thus in what follows, we index all spreads by a superscript “m” to indicate
that they are expressed in dollar terms. When the tick size is zero, a trader’s reservation spread
is exactly equal to his per period waiting cost, i.e. jRm
i = δi
λ (i ∈ {1,2}). We denote by Km the
largest possible monetary spread. Finally T(jm) denotes the expected waiting time for a limit
order trader who creates a spread of jm dollars. Let rc def
= Kmλ−δ1
Kmλ+δ1.N o t i c et h a t0 <r c ≤ 1 since
jRm
1 <K m by assumption (Equation (3)). The next proposition extends Propositions 4 and 5 to
the case in which there is no mandatory minimum price variation.
Proposition 6 :S u p p o s et h a t∆ =0 .I fr>r c and δ1 > 0, the equilibrium is as follows:22
1. The impatient traders never submit a limit order.
2. There exist q0 spreads nm
1 <n m
2 <. . .<n m
q0,w i t hnm
1 = δ1
λ and nm
q0 = Km such that a patient
trader submits an nm
h -limit order when he faces a spread in (nm
h ,n m
h+1]a n dam a r k e to r d e r
when he faces a spread smaller than or equal to nm
1 . (The expression for q0 is given in
Appendix A).
3. The spreads are: nm
h = nm
h−1 + Ψm
h (0), where Ψm
h (0) = (2rh−1)δ1
λ ,f o rh =2 ,...q 0 − 1 and
the stationary probability of the hth spread is uh, as given in Section 3.4.
21See Seppi (1997), Harris (1998), Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), Christie, Harris, and Kandel (2002), and
Kadan (2002) for arguments for and against the reduction in the tick size in various market structures. The idea
that a reduction in the tick size can impair market resiliency is new to our paper.
22If r<r
c then spread improvements are so small that the competitive spread is never achieved, and resiliency
is zero. We discuss this case later. The same problem arises if patient traders’ waiting cost is zero.











h =2 ,...,q 0 − 1 and (3) T(jm)=T(nm
h ) for jm ∈ (nm
h−1,n m
h ].
Proposition 6 shows that when r>r c the equilibria with or without a minimum price variation
are qualitatively similar. The smallest possible spread is patient traders’ per period waiting cost,
i.e. δ1
λ . In contrast, when ∆ > 0, it is equal to this cost r o u n d e du pt othe nearest tick. Thus the
competitive spread is larger when a minimum price variation is enforced. This rounding eﬀect
propagates to all equilibrium spreads. To make this statement formal, let nm
h (∆) denote the hth
smallest spread in the set of spreads on the equilibrium path when the tick size is ∆ ≥ 0, and let
q∆ be the number of equilibrium spreads in this set. The following holds.
Corollary 3 “Rounding eﬀect”: Suppose r>r c.T h e ni ne q u i l i b r i u m :( 1 )q∆ ≤ q0, (2) nm
h (0) ≤
nm
h (∆), for h<q ∆, and (3) nm
h (0) ≤ nm
q∆(∆) for q∆ ≤ h ≤ q0. This means that the support of
possible spreads when the tick size is zero is shifted to the left compared to the support of possible
spreads when the tick size is strictly positive.
Given this result, it is tempting to conclude that the average spread is always minimized when
there is no minimum price variation. This indeed has been the conventional wisdom behind the
tick size reductions in many markets. We show below that this reasoning does not draw the whole
picture because it ignores the impact of the tick size on the dynamics of the spread in between
transactions.
When r>r c and δ1 > 0, in zero-tick equilibrium, traders improve the spread by more than
an inﬁnitesimal amount (Ψm
h (0) > 0).23 Intuitively, patient traders improve the quote by a
non-inﬁnitesimal amount to speed up execution. However, as r decreases, spread improvements
become smaller and smaller: traders bid less aggressively since market orders arrive more fre-
quently (see the discussion following Proposition 5). When ∆ > 0 price improvements can never
be smaller than the tick size; thus for small values of r traders improve prices by more than they
would in absence of a minimum price variation. We refer to this eﬀect as being the “spread
improvement eﬀect”. The spread improvement eﬀect works to increase the speed at which spread
narrows in between transactions. For this reason imposing a minimum price variation helps to
23Traders must improve upon prevailing quotes (Assumption A.2). However when the tick size is zero, they can
improve by an arbitrarily small amount. Proposition 6 shows that they do not take advantage of this possibility
when r>r
c.
26make the market more resilient. This intuition can be made more rigorous by using the measure
of market resiliency, R,d e ﬁned in Section 3.2.2.
Corollary 4 (tick size and resiliency): Other things being equal, the resiliency of the limit order
market (R) is always larger when there is a minimum price variation than in the absence of a
minimum price variation. Furthermore, the resiliency of the market (R) approaches zero as r
approaches rc in the absence of a minimum price variation, whereas it is always strictly greater
than zero when a minimum price variation is imposed.
Intuitively, as r approaches rc from above, the spread improvements become inﬁnitesimal
when the spread is large (e.g. equal to K). Thus the quotes are always set arbitrarily close to
the largest possible ask price, A, or the smallest possible bid price, B.T h i se x p l a i n sw h y ,i nt h e
absence of a minimum price variation, the resiliency of the market vanishes when r goes to rc.
Imposing a minimum price variation in this kind of weakly resilient markets is a way to avoid
this pathological situation, because it forces traders to improve by non-inﬁnitesimal amounts.
Thus, intuitively, imposing a minimum price variation can be a way to reduce the expected
spread, despite the rounding eﬀect, because it makes the market more resilient. We demonstrate
this claim by providing a numerical example. The values of the parameters are as in Example
3 except that r =0 .97 (i.e. θ =0 .49, and the market is weakly resilient), so that the condition
r>r c is satisﬁed.24 Table 3 gives all the monetary spreads on the equilibrium path for two
diﬀerent values of the tick size: (1) ∆ =0and (2) ∆ =0 .0625. The two last lines of the table give
the expected spread and the resiliency obtained for each regime. First, observe the “rounding
eﬀect” - the thirteen smallest spreads are lower when ∆ =0 ,t h a ni nt h ec a s eo f∆ =0 .0625.
Second, observe the “spread improvement eﬀect” - the spread reduction is quicker for every spread
level if a minimum price variation is enforced. This explains why market resiliency is smaller when
there is no minimum price variation. For this reason, the expected spread turns out to be larger
in this case ($1.58 instead of $1.48).
24Given the values of the parameters r
c ≈ 0.92.
27Table 3 - Rounding and Spread Improvement Eﬀects
(Parameter Values: λ =1 ,Km =2 .5, δ1 =0 .1, δ2 =0 .25,r=0 .97)
hn m
h (∆ =0 ) nm
h (∆ =0 .0625)
1$ 0 .1$ 0 .125
2$ 0 .294 $0.375
3$ 0 .482 $0.625
4$ 0 .665 $0.813
5$ 0 .842 $1
6$ 1 .014 $1.188
7$ 1 .181 $1.375
8$ 1 .343 $1.563









Expected Spread $1.58 $1.48
Resiliency 1.1 × 10−5 1.9 × 10−4
S of a rw eh a v ec o m p a r e das i t u a t i o nw i t ha n dwithout a mandatory minimum price varia-
tion. More generally, the “spread improvement” eﬀect implies that the expected spread does not
necessarily decrease when the tick size is reduced. In order to see this point, consider Table 4. It
demonstrates which of the following tick sizes, { 1
100, 1
16, 1
8}, minimizes the expected spread for dif-
ferent values of r. Consistent with the above argument ∆ = 1
100 does not minimize the expected
spread for low values of r. However as r increases, inducing traders to make large improvements
by imposing a large minimum price variation becomes less eﬀective, since they already submit
aggressive orders. For this reason, the “spread improvement eﬀect” becomes of second order
compared to the “rounding eﬀect”. In fact Table 4 shows that the tick size which minimizes
28the expected spread decreases with r and that once r ≥ 1 the expected spread is minimized at
∆ = 1
100.
Table 4 - The Tick Size Minimizing the Expected Spread























Finally we brieﬂy discuss the case in which r<r c. In this case, traders improve upon large
s p r e a d sb ya ni n ﬁnitesimal amount. Thus the quotes are always set arbitrarily close to the largest
possible ask price, A, o rt h es m a l l e s tp o s s i b l eb i dp r i c e ,B.25 Thus market resiliency is zero, as
when r goes to rc. Imposing a minimum price variation is a way to restore market resiliency
since spread improvements are non-inﬁnitesimal as soon as ∆ > 0 (Proposition 5).
To sum up, reducing or even eliminating thet i c ks i z em a yo rm a yn o tr e d u c et h ea v e r a g e
spread. The impact depends on the proportion of patient traders in the market, r.M a n y
empirical papers have found a decline in the average quoted spreads following a reduction in tick
size. These papers, however, do not control for the ratio of patient to impatient traders. One
diﬃculty of course is that this ratio cannot be directly observed. In Section 5, we argue that
the proportion of patient traders is likely to decrease over the trading day. In this case, the
impact of a decrease in the tick size on the quoted spread should vary throughout the trading
day. Speciﬁcally, a decrease in the tick size may increase the average spread at the end of the
trading day. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no test of this hypothesis.
4.2 Fast vs. Slow Markets
In this section, we analyze the eﬀect of orders’ arrival rate (λ) on the dynamics of the spread
and the expected spread. We compare two markets, F and S, which diﬀer only with respect
to orders’ arrival rate, λ. Speciﬁcally, λF > λS, which implies that the average waiting time
b e t w e e no r d e r si nm a r k e tF is smaller than in market S.T h u s ,other things being equal, events
(orders and trades) happen faster in clock time in market F. For this reason, we refer to market
25This would also be the case if patient traders’ waiting cost were equal to zero (δ1 =0 ). When r<r
c or δ1 =0 ,
the equilibrium (when there is no minimum price variation) is diﬃcult to describe formally since traders improve
upon prevailing quotes by an inﬁnitesimal, but strictly positive, amount.
29F as a fast market and market S as a slow market. Proposition 5 and Corollary 1 immediately
yield the next result.
Corollary 5 : Consider two markets with diﬀering orders’ arrival rates: λF > λS. Then:
1. The spreads on the equilibrium path in markets F and S are such that: (1) nh(λF) ≤ nh(λS),
for h<q S and (2) nh(λF) ≤ K, for qS ≤ h ≤ qF. This means that the support of possible
spreads in the fast market is shifted to the left compared to the support of possible spreads
in the slow market.
2. The slow market is more resilient than the fast market.
The economic intuition of these results is as follows. On the one hand, the waiting time of
a trader with a given priority level in the queue of limit orders is smaller in the fast market
(see Proposition 4), thus patient traders require a smaller compensation for waiting. This eﬀect
explains the ﬁrst part of the proposition. On the other hand, spread improvements are larger and
the spread narrows more quickly in the slow market (see the discussion following Proposition 5).
Hence the slow market is more resilient.
These two eﬀects have an opposite impact on the average spread. Unfortunately it is not
possible to determine analytically which eﬀect is dominant. Simulations show that a decrease in
the order arrival rate enlarges the expected spread for a wide range of parameters’ values (i.e. the
ﬁrst eﬀect dominates) but not always. Table 5 illustrates this claim by reporting the equilibrium
expected dollar spread for various pairs (θ,λ).26 If we assume that all the assumed values for the
pairs (θ,λ) have the same probability, the correlation between the average spread and the order
arrival rate is negative and equal to −0.24. This indicates that overall the average spread tends
to decline when the order arrival rate increases.
Notice that the eﬀects associated with a change in λ are very similar to those associated with
a change in the tick size. Two forces contribute to a small average spread: (i) small frictional
costs on the one hand (a small tick, small waiting time between arrivals) and (ii) large spread
improvements. Our analysis points out that factors which lessen frictional costs may reduce
spread improvements, resulting in less resilient markets and eventually higher spreads.
26The condition sc = K holds for all parameter values considered in this table. Hence, we use Proposition 5,
Lemma 2 and Equation (12) to compute the equilibrium spreads.
30Table 5 - Expected Spreads and Order Arrival Rates
(Parameter Values: ∆ =0 .125,Km =2 .5,δ1 =0 .1,δ2 =0 .25)
θ
λ
0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65
1 2.35 2.25 2 1.42 1.05 0.91 0.79
4/5 2.3542 2.251 2.02 1.46 1.20 1.18 1.01
2/3 2.3542 2.252 2.02 1.46 1.17 1.11 1.145
1/2 2.3542 2.2532 2.03 1.56 1.34 1.24 1.146
1/3 2.3543 2.2584 1.94 1.51 1.56 1.44 1.41
1/5 2.3539 2.1 1.98 1.82 1.80 1.89 1.76
5 Empirical Implications
Trading Intensity and Spreads.
In his pioneering paper, Demsetz (1968) argues that in the presence of waiting costs, the
spread and the transaction rate should be inversely related. He writes (p. 41): “The fundamental
force working to reduce the spread is the time rate of transactions. The greater the frequency of
transacting, the lower will be the cost of waiting in a queue of speciﬁed length and, therefore, the
lower will be the spreads that traders are willing to submit to preempt positions in the trading
queue.”
In our framework both the transaction rate and the spreads are endogenous. In what follows,
we study the relation between the spread and the transaction rate to test Demsetz’s conjecture.
Our main ﬁnding is that the relationship between the spread and the transaction rate is not
necessarily negative. This depends on whether or not, we control for the eﬀect of the order
arrival rate.
Denote by ¯ D the unconditional duration, i.e. the expected time elapsing between two con-
secutive transactions. Clearly, transaction frequency is inversely related to ¯ D. Similarly let ¯ Dh
denote the expected time elapsing between two consecutive transactions, conditional on the ﬁrst
transaction taking place when the spread is nh. We refer to this variable as a conditional du-
ration. Analyzing the eﬀect of the exogenous parameters on the conditional durations helps to
understand the eﬀect of these parameters on the unconditional duration. We proceed to derive
31the two duration measures.
















h=1 θq−h(1 − θ)h−1
¸
. (14)
Interestingly, Equations (13) and (14) reveal that the order arrival rate, λ,i sn o tt h eo n l y
determinant of conditional durations between transactions. The proportion of patient traders, θ,
plays an important role as well. As expected, each conditional duration declines in the arrival
rate, λ, and increases in the proportion of patient traders, θ. Intuitively, the larger is θ,t h e
larger is the probability of arrival of many consecutive patient traders, which postpone the next
transaction.
The unconditional duration depends not only on the conditional durations but also on the
probability distribution of spreads. This makes it very diﬃcult to study analytically the eﬀects
o f t h eo r d e ra r r i v a lr a t ea n dt h ep r o p o r t i o no fp atient traders on the unconditional duration.
To gain intuition, Table 6 calculates the unconditional duration for diﬀerent values of θ and λ,
holding other parameters constant.
Table 6 - Unconditional Duration Between Trades (clock time)
(Parameters Values: ∆ =0 .125,Km =2 .5,δ1 =0 .1,δ2 =0 .25)
θ
λ
0.35 0.40 .45 0.50 .55 0.60 .65
1 1.53 1.66 1.81 1.90 1.92 1.93 1.93
4/5 1.92 2.08 2.26 2.32 2.38 2.41 2.41
2/3 2.32 .49 2.71 2.78 2.81 2.83 2.9
1/2 3.07 3.33 3.60 3.67 3.75 3.78 3.87
1/3 4.61 4.99 5.27 5.29 5.55 .55 .65
1/5 7.68 8.10 8.42 8.54 8.87 9.17 8.98
As the conditional durations, the unconditional duration declines in the order arrival rate, λ.
In almost all cases, the unconditional duration increases with the proportion of patient traders,
32θ. This property does not always hold, however because an increase in θ has two opposite eﬀects
on the unconditional duration. On the one hand, a higher proportion of patient traders increases
each conditional duration and thus works to enlarge the unconditional duration. But a higher
proportion of patient traders also increases market resiliency (see Section 3). This eﬀect increases
the frequency of lower spreads. Now, Equation (13) implies that the duration between trades is
smaller conditional on the spread being small (Dh increases with h). Thus the overall eﬀect of
θ on the unconditional duration is ambiguous. Inspection of Table 6 shows that the ﬁrst eﬀect
dominates in many cases (i.e., the unconditional duration increases with θ) but not always.
These ﬁndings have several implications for empirical research. First, two markets with
identical order arrival rates may still exhibit very diﬀerent levels of activity, if the proportion
of patient traders in these markets diﬀers. Moreover, an increase in the order arrival rate does
not necessarily lead to a proportional increase in transaction frequency, as often assumed in
time deformation models (see Hasbrouck (1999) for a discussion of these models). Suppose, for
instance, that a common factor raises the order arrival rate and the proportion of patient traders.
Then the increase in the order arrival rate will not necessarily be associated with an increase in the
transaction frequency. In any case, the frequencies of orders and trades will be less than perfectly
correlated. Hasbrouck (1999) shows that indeed these frequencies are not highly correlated, in
particular over short horizons.
Second, for a given order arrival rate, variations in the proportion of patient traders create a
positive relationship between transaction frequencies and spreads. Recall that a decrease in the
proportion of patient traders has two eﬀects. First, it reduces limit order traders’ aggressive-
ness. Second, it yields a larger transactions rate since impatient traders submit market orders.
The combination of these two eﬀects generates a positive correlation between spreads and the
transaction rate. The simulations in Tables 5 and 6 illustrate this point. In fact, if we assume
that all the assumed values of θ have the same probability, the correlation between the average
spread and the transaction frequency (deﬁned as the inverse of the unconditional duration) varies
between 0.7 when λ =1 /5,a n d0.94 when λ =4 /5.
Finally, for a given proportion of patient traders, variations in the order arrival rate tend
to create a negative relationship between the expected spread and the transaction frequency.
Actually, as explained in Section 4.2, an increase in λ often results in smaller average spreads.
On the other hand, it raises the transaction frequency. The combination of these eﬀects results
33in a negative correlation between the transaction rate and the average spread. This is not always
the case, however, since the relationship between the order arrival rate and the average spread
is non-monotonic (see Section 4.2). For instance, if we assume that the chosen values of λ in
Tables 5 and 6 are equally probable, then the correlation between the expected spread and the
transaction rate is negative for all values of θ,e x c e p tθ =0 .4 and θ =0 .45.
Demsetz (1968) and several subsequent studies (e.g. Harris 1994) have found a negative cross-
sectional relation between the number of transactions per day (a measure of the transaction rate)
and the average spread. This empirical ﬁnding is not inconsistent with our results because these
studies have not controlled for the eﬀect of the order arrival rate. In fact, for the examples
considered in Table 5 and 6, the correlation between the average spread and the transaction
frequency is negative. The exact prediction of our model is that the spread should be positively
related to the transaction rate, controlling for the order arrival rate. Testing this prediction oﬀers
a way to obtain a better economic understanding of the empirical correlations between spreads
and transaction rates.
Intraday Patterns.
It is well known that spreads and trading activity follow a reversed J-shaped pattern in many
limit order markets.27 This pattern has proved diﬃcult to explain in asymmetric information
models. For instance, in Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988), traders concentrate their transactions
at times where spreads are small, not large. Furthermore, Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans
(1997) empirically show that the adverse selection component of the spread declines throughout
the day. Finally, Chung et al. (1999) ﬁnd that intraday patterns on the NYSE are mainly due to
intraday variations in spread set by limit order traders rather than by the specialist. This ﬁnding
does not support inventory-based explanations for the rise of the spread towards the end of the
trading day.
We suggest that the intraday patterns are driven by the systematic variations in the proportion
of patient traders during the day. In general, inability to trade overnight is a binding constraint
for many investors. Moreover, many institutions mark to market at the end of the day; thus
they prefer to trade closer to that deadline. This also creates pressure towards the end of the
27For recent evidence see Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) for the Paris Bourse or Chung, Van Ness and Van Ness
(1999) for the NYSE.
34day.28 If this is the case, the proportion of impatient traders and, thereby, limit order ﬁll rate
should steadily increase towards the end of the day. The model predicts that spreads and the
transaction frequency should be higher towards the end of the day (see the discussion above),
which is consistent with the stylized facts. Furthermore, the aggressiveness of limit order traders
should decline towards the close, resulting in less resilient markets (see the discussion following
Proposition 5). To the best of our knowledge, this prediction (markets are less resilient in the
last part of the trading day) has not been tested yet. Pagano and Schwartz (2002) show that an
introduction of a closing auction in Paris Bourse caused a reduction in spreads in the last half
hour of trading. Traditional theory would predict the opposite as the closing auction is likely
to draw liquidity away from the continuous market. We, however, interpret this event as an
introduction of a new trading opportunity, which increases the patience of traders earlier; thus
causing the spread reduction.
Spread Improvements.
Several empirical studies of limit order markets have analyzed the impact of the state of the
book on the order ﬂow (e.g. Biais et al. (1995), Griﬃth et al.(2000) or Benston, Irvine and
Kandel (2001)). These studies classify new orders by their aggressiveness, deﬁn e db yt h ep o s i t i o n
of the price of a limit order relative to prevailing quotes. For instance, a limit order within
the prevailing quotes is more aggressive than a limit order behind the best quotes. Our paper
suggests a measure of aggressiveness of the limit orders: the amount by which limit order traders
improve upon prevailing quotes. Proposition 5 has the following implication.
Corollary 7 : The amount by which limit order traders improve upon the prevailing quotes
depends on the size of the inside spread. This amount increases with the size of the spread when
r>1, and decreases with the size of the spread when r<1.
Recall that the price concession a trader is willing to oﬀer is equal to the reduction in the
waiting time he obtains (Equation (8)). When r>1, the waiting time function is “convex” in
the sense that (T(nh) − T(nh−1)) increases with h. Hence, liquidity suppliers are willing to oﬀer
larger spread improvements when the spread is large. When r<1, the waiting time function
is “concave” (i.e. (T(nh) − T(nh−1)) decreases in h); thus liquidity suppliers oﬀer larger spread
28Recent experimental ﬁndings by Bloomﬁeld, O’Hara, and Saar (2002) support this intuition. They show that
liquidity traders who are assigned a trading target switch f o r ml i m i tt om a r k e to r d e r sa tt h ee n do ft r a d i n gs e s s i o n s .
35improvements at small spreads. If the proportion of patient traders decreases over the trading
day then the direction of the relationship between spread improvements and the size of the spread
may change over time during the trading day.
Engle and Patton (2001) ﬁnd that the size of the spread is an important determinant of the
dynamics of bid and ask prices for stocks listed on the NYSE. Their time-series analysis shows
that the change in the log of the best ask (bid) price is negatively (positively) related to the size
of the spread. This means that the amount by which traders improve upon prevailing quotes is
related to the size of the spread, as predicted by the model.
The model yields predictions for the cross-sectional variation of spread improvements as well.
For example, Proposition 5 implies a negative relation between spread improvements and the order
arrival rate, which may vary across stocks. Also, Proposition 5 shows that quote improvements
decline in θ. We expect stocks that belong to a widely followed index to attract more impatient
traders than other stocks, since many index fund managers must trade rapidly to minimize
their tracking error. Hence, controlling for other stock characteristics, e.g., λ,w ee x p e c ts p r e a d
improvements to be smaller for stocks, which belong to an index.
Time-to-execution. Lo, McKinlay and Zhang (2001) emphasize the need of statistical
models of limit order execution times to assist traders in their choice between market and limit
orders. An equilibrium model, such as this one, provides helpful insights for speciﬁcations of
these models. In particular, we ﬁnd that the time-to-execution for limit orders decreases with
the order arrival rate, and increases with the proportion of patient traders (see Equation (5) and
Figure 1). For a given order arrival rate, the transaction frequency is negatively related to the
proportion of patient traders, and thus can serve as a proxy for θ. This suggests that econometric
models of time-to-execution should include the order arrival rate and the transaction frequency
as explanatory variables. These variables should be negatively related to time-to-execution.
Lo, McKinlay and Zhang (2001) ﬁnd that time-to-execution decreases with various measures
of trading intensity. They do not consider the eﬀect of the order arrival rate, however. They also
point out that there is a large variation in mean time-to-execution across stocks. According to
our model, these variations could be explained by the fact that stocks diﬀer with respect to the
order arrival rate, maybe because they diﬀer with respect to the number of shareholders.
366R o b u s t n e s s
Recall our assumptions regarding the trading process: A.1 - no order cancellations and resubmis-
sions; A.2 - limit orders cannot queue at or behind the best quotes, and A.3 - buyers and sellers
alternate. Since these assumptions are clearly unrealistic, the robustness of the implications ob-
tained in our model is a concern. We address this concern in this section, by ﬁrst stating the
technical reasons for these assumptions, and then arguing that our results are not an artifact
of these assumptions. We present conditions under which our non-queueing restriction becomes
non-binding. We also show, using examples, that the main properties of the model (described in
Section 3) persist when we relax the assumption that buyers and sellers alternate. Overall these
robustness tests show that our main results are not driven by the technical assumptions, and
that the economic intuitions are not changed when these assumptions are relaxed.
6.1 Cancellations and Resubmissions
To the best of our knowledge there are no theoretical papers that allow for strategic cancellations
and resubmissions of orders in a dynamic game; such a game is just too complex to analyze.29
We have not found the solution to this problem, thus we must also assume that our traders make
one strategic decision only.
Holliﬁeld, Miller, Sandås and Slive (2002) take into account the possibility that traders cancel
their orders. Their modeling approach consists in assuming that cancellations occur at random
points in time after the initial submission. Unfortunately it is not possible to proceed in this way
here since all traders must eventually carry out their desired transaction in our framework. Thus
we would need to arbitrarily specify the payoﬀ of a trader in case of cancellation. Consequently,
we do not engage in this exercise. Hence one limitation of our model is that it cannot explain
why traders cancel or modify their orders.
In reality most cancellations seem to stem from a particular behavior that we do not seek
to study in this paper. Hasbrouck and Saar (2002) show that the majority of the limit orders
submitted on Island ECN are cancelled, and the majority of those are cancelled within two
29Harris (1998) studies the optimal dynamic order submission strategies in a partial equilibrium set-up (that is
with an exogenous order ﬂow). Even in this case, allowing traders to cancell and resubmit their orders is quite
complex.
37seconds after submission. These, so called “ﬂeeting” orders seek liquidity rather than provide it,
and their execution rates are very low. Many other cancelled limit orders were placed deep behind
the best quote in hopes of a lucky execution. Neither one of these order types should aﬀect our
conclusions. Tkach (2002) studies the limit order submission of the 100 most liquid stocks traded
on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. The prevailing regulatory and institutional features do not
induce “ﬂeeting” orders; nevertheless, she shows that almost 40% of limit orders are cancelled.
Out of these less than 30% are price improving limit orders that we study. Moreover, the median
time to cancellation is 11 minutes, and over 11% of all cancelled orders cancel within a minute of
submission. This is a short time, given the low volume in most of these stocks. They represent
ad i ﬀerent phenomenon, which is outside the focus of this model.
6.2 Queuing at the Inside Quotes
We have assumed that traders cannot place limit orders at or behind the existing inside quotes.
In reality, such quotes are allowed and used. Allowing traders to queue at the best quotes cannot
accelerate the rate at which the spread narrows between transactions, but it may reduce it. Thus,
allowing traders to queue results in less competitive and less resilient limit order markets, other
things being equal. This, however, should not invalidate the ﬁndings that (i) an increase in the
proportion of patient traders or (ii) a decrease in the order arrival rate yield more resilient and
more competitive limit order markets. Actually, traders’ willingness to queue must be smaller
when time-to-executions are large. Now, time-to-executions enlarges when the proportion of
patient traders becomes larger or when the order arrival rate becomes smaller. For these reasons,
the number of limit orders placed at a given price will decrease in these two cases. This means
that spreads will narrow more quickly when the proportion of patient traders increases or the
order arrival rate decreases, even when queuing is an option.
If the previous intuition is correct, traders should decide not to queue at all when the propor-
tion of patient traders is large enough or the order arrival rate is small enough. In this case, the
equilibrium is exactly as described in Section 3. The next proposition shows that this intuition
is correct assuming that time priority is enforced, i.e. limit orders entered ﬁr s ta tag i v e np r i c e
are executed ﬁrst.
Proposition 7 : Suppose traders are heterogeneous and are allowed to queue at the inside quotes
38subject to a strict time priority. Then if
λ∆
δ1
≤ 2[1+θ(2 − θ)], (15)
the equilibrium when traders are not allowed to queue (see Section 3) is an equilibrium in this
setting as well.
Suppose that traders use the trading strategies described in Section 3, and give them the
freedom to queue at the best quotes. Under Condition (15), traders prefer to submit limit
orders improving upon the inside quotes rather than queuing. Hence, traders’ strategies form an
equilibrium even though traders have the possibility to queue.
Observe that the R.H.S. of Condition (15) increases with θ (taking values between 2 and 4).
This means that traders will not queue (and markets will be more resilient) when the proportion
of patient traders is large enough, as conjectured. Furthermore, the L.H.S increases with the
order arrival rate, λ. This means that traders will not queue when the order arrival rate is
small enough, as conjectured as well. Finally, queuing is never optimal when the tick size (∆)
is suﬃciently small, since liquidity providers can jump ahead of the queue at a low cost. This
reasoning suggests that the number of limit orders placed at the same price should have decreased
following tick size reductions.
Finally, it is worth stressing that Condition (15) is satisﬁed in all the numerical examples
we gave in the paper. It follows that the possibility of queuing does not per se invalidate our
comparative statics, in particular those regarding the eﬀect of the tick size.
6.3 Buyers and Sellers Arrive Randomly
When buyers and sellers alternate, the expected waiting time function has a recursive structure.
This property considerably simpliﬁe st h ea n a l y s i so ft h et r a d i n gg a m eb e c a u s ew ec a ns o l v ef o r
the equilibrium order placement strategies by backward induction (see the discussion following
Lemma 1). In Appendix B we present a simple setting that allows us to study our game, assuming
that every arriving trader can be either a buyer or a seller with equal probability. In this appendix
we explain why it is no longer possible to obtain a recursive expression for the expected waiting
time. Furthermore we show that the waiting time for a given limit order depends on the entire
state of the book when the order is placed and not only on the spread created by the limit
39order. While these technical issues preclude any general analytical solution to the problem, we
demonstrate below using examples that the basic economic intuitions of our model persist.
As the waiting time function is not recursive, we cannot solve for the equilibrium strategies
using backward induction. Rather we have to employ the following solution method. First, we
“guess” (conjecture) equilibrium order placement strategies for patient and impatient traders.
Second we use the conjectured equilibrium strategies in order to calculate expected waiting times
of each possible limit order in each possible state of the book. This task is tedious and requires
solving K(K +1 ) /2 simultaneous linear equations, where K = A − B is the number of possible
ticks in the book.30 Third, we check that the “guessed” strategies are indeed optimal given the
expected waiting times computed in the second step. If it turns out that these strategies are not
optimal one has to repeat all these steps until an equilibrium is found.
For small levels of K the procedure described above is feasible, though highly tedious. We
c h o o s et h ec a s eo fK =4to demonstrate the robustness of our results. This choice of K
allows for diﬀerent levels of spread improvements. For example, when the spread has 3 ticks,
a trader can improve upon prevailing quotes by either 1 tick (small improvement) or 2 ticks
(large improvement) or submit a market order. This allows us to show that limit order traders’
aggressiveness depends on θ, as in the baseline model.
In order to illustrate this point, we present below the results of three examples corresponding
to the three resiliency levels deﬁned in the paper. The detailed presentation and solution of these
examples is relegated to Appendix B. We show that the equilibrium has the same properties as
the equilibrium obtained when buyers and sellers alternate. In particular, limit order traders
place more aggressive orders and thereby the market is more resilient when the proportion of
patient traders is large.
Example 4 - A Strongly Resilient Book (homogenous traders). Set K =4 , ∆ =
0.125, δ1 = δ2 =0 .05, and assume that each arrival is either a buyer or a seller with equal
probabilities. Traders are homogenous, hence θ has no role in this example. The following order
placement strategy constitutes an equilibrium (see Appendix B): (i) when the spread is larger
than 1 tick, buyers and sellers of both types submit a 1-limit order and (ii) when the spread is
equal to 1 tick, both submit a market order. This equilibrium is identical to the homogeneous
equilibrium in Proposition 1. Indeed, after a transaction, the spread increases (to 4 ticks) but it
30The number of equations is large because the waiting function depends on the entire state of the book.
40reverts to traders’ reservation spread (1 tick) before the next transaction. This market is therefore
strongly resilient (R =1 ).
Example 5 - A Resilient Book (heterogenous traders, large θ). Set: ∆ =0 .125,
K =4 , θ =0 .7, λ =1 , δ1 =0 .02,a n dδ2 =0 .1, and assume that each arrival is either a
buyer or a seller with equal probabilities. The following order placement strategies constitute an
equilibrium (see Appendix B). An impatient trader always submits a market order. A patient
trader submits (i) a 2-limit order when the spread is equal to 3 or 4 ticks, (ii) a 1-limit order
when the spread is equal to 2 ticks and (iii) a market order when the spread is equal to 1 tick.
The resiliency of the market is R =0 .49.
Example 6 - A Weakly Resilient Book (heterogenous traders, small θ). Set: ∆ =
0.125, K =4 , θ =0 .3, λ =1 , δ1 =0 .02,a n dδ2 =0 .1, and assume that each arrival is either a
buyer or a seller with equal probabilities. The following order placement strategies constitute an
equilibrium (see Appendix B). An impatient trader always submits a market order. When the
spread is larger than 1 tick, a patient trader places a limit order improving the spread by 1 tick.
When the spread is equal to 1 tick, a patient trader places a market order. The resiliency of the
market is R =0 .027.
Consider the case in which the spread is equal to 4 ticks and a patient trader arrives in the
market. In Example 5, the trader improves upon prevailing quotes by 2 ticks whereas in Example
6 he improves by only one tick. Thus, as in the baseline model, limit order traders use a more
aggressive bidding strategy when the proportion of patient traders is large (Example 5). The
economic intuition is exactly the same as when buyers and sellers alternate. Limit order traders
bid more aggressively when θ is large because their waiting times are larger, other things equal
(the waiting times of each limit order are derived in Appendix B). It follows that the resiliency
of the market is larger when the proportion of patient traders is large (Example 5). Furthermore
we show in Appendix B that the stationary distribution of spreads is skewed towards small (resp.
large) spreads in Example 5 (resp. Example 6). Consequently the average spread is smaller in
the market dominated by patient traders: the average spread is equal to $0.22 in Example 5 and
$0.375 in Example 6.
These examples demonstrate that relaxing the alternating arrival assumption does not change
the conclusions obtained when buyers and sellers alternate. The driving force of our model is
that limit order traders react to exogenous increases in their waiting costs by submitting more
41aggressive orders. This basic economic intuition does not hinge on the assumption that buyers
and sellers alternate. However, relaxing this assumption prevents us from solving the model in
general. We view our model as an elegant way to by-pass this problem without losing much of
the economic intuitions.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We consider a model of price formation in a limit order market. Traders in our model need
to trade for exogenous reasons and diﬀer in terms of impatience. Upon arrival they decide to
submit a market order or a limit order. This decision is driven by a trade-oﬀ between the cost
of immediacy and the cost of delayed execution, as ﬁrst suggested by Demsetz (1968). Under
simplifying assumptions we derive the equilibrium order placement strategies. We ﬁnd that
traders submit more aggressive limit orders when the proportion of patient traders increases or
the arrival rate decreases. For this reason, markets with a relatively high proportion of patient
traders or a relatively small order arrival rate are more resilient. We also show that a reduction
in the tick size impairs market resiliency, thus under some circumstances it may increase the
average spread.
The model generates many testable predictions, such as: (i) a positive relationship between
trading frequency and the spread sizes, controlling for the order arrival rate; (ii) markets with a
high order arrival rate are less resilient, but feature smaller spreads; (iii) limit order aggressiveness
can be positively or negatively related to the size of the spread depending on whether patient
or impatient traders dominate the trading population; (iv) spreads and trading frequency should
increase over the course of the trading day, while limit order aggressiveness should decline towards
the end of the day.
Our model suggests that a limit order market will be quite illiquid (featuring a large average
spread and lacking resiliency) when the proportion of impatient traders is large. In this case,
designated liquidity suppliers may drastically improve the quality of the market. The eﬀect of
designated liquidity suppliers on the equilibrium described in this paper is a possible direction
for future research.
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8A p p e n d i x A
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Step 1. Suppose a trader (say a buyer) submits a j-limit order when the spread is s.B yA . 3
the following trader is a seller. We claim that at the time the j-limit order is cleared, the spread
will revert to s. We prove this claim by induction on j.I fj =1then by A.2 the next order is a
sell market order and the spread immediately reverts to s. Suppose now that j>1, and assume
that our assertion is true for all k =1 ,...,j− 1. By A.2 the seller must either submit a market
order or a k-limit order with k =1 ,...,j−1. If the seller submits a market order then the spread
reverts s. If, on the other hand, the seller submits a k-limit order with k ∈ {1,...,j− 1},t h e n
by the induction hypothesis, when that seller’s k-limit order is cleared the spread reverts to j.I t
follows that when the j-limit order is cleared the spread reverts to s as required.
Step 2. Consider a trader, say a buyer, who submits a j-limit order. The expected waiting
time of this order from this moment on is T(j). By A.2, this buyer acquires price priority (he
posts the best bid price). Suppose that the next trader (a seller by A.3) submits a k-limit order
with k ∈ {1,...,j− 1}. When this k-limit order will be executed, the spread will revert to j
(step 1). As traders do not cancel their orders or do not submit orders behind the best quotes,
the state of the book will then be exactly as when the buyer initially posted the j-limit order.
In particularthe original buyer will have price priority. Thus, when the spread reverts to j,t h e
original buyer’s expected waiting time from that moment on is T(j) as well.
Step 3. We have explained in the text why T(1) = 1
λ. Now consider a trader (say a buyer)
who submits a j-limit order with j>1. The next trader (a seller) must choose among j options.
With probability α0(j) he submits a market order that clears the buyer’s limit order. In this
46case, the expected waiting time of the buyer is 1
λ. With probability αk(j), the seller submits a
k-limit order (k =1 ,...,j− 1). In the latter case, the original buyer’s expected waiting time is:
1
λ + T(k)+T(j). Indeed, he has to wait (1) 1/λ - for the seller to arrive, (2) T(k) -u n t i lt h e
seller’s order is cleared and the spread reverts to j (by Step 1), and (3) another T(j) as we are
back to the original position (by Step 2). Overall the original buyer’s expected waiting time,














If α0(j) > 0, we obtain the second part of the lemma by solving for T(j) and using the fact that
Pj−1
k=0 αk(j)=1 . As for the third part of the lemma: If α0(j)=0then the seller never submits
a market order when the spread is j. Thus the waiting time of the buyer who creates the j-limit
order is inﬁnite: T(j)=+ ∞.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
It follows immediately from the arguments which precede the proposition.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
We ﬁrst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3 : Suppose that facing a spread of size s (s ∈ {1,...,K− 1}), trader i (i ∈ {1,2})
submits a j-limit order with 0 ≤ j<s . Then, facing a spread of size s +1 ,h ee i t h e rs u b m i t sa n
s-limit order or a j-limit order.
Proof. By assumption trader i submits a j-limit order when he faces a spread of size s.T h u s :
πi(j) ≥ πi(k) k =0 ,...j− 1,j+1 ,...,s− 1.
Now, suppose that trader i faces a spread of size s+1.I fπi(s) < πi(j) then trader i will submit
a j-limit order since πi(j) ≥ πi(k) for all k =0 ,...,s.I f πi(s) ≥ πi(j) then trader i submits a
s-limit order since πi(s) ≥ πi(k) for all k =0 ,...,s− 1.
By deﬁnition of the reservation spread, and since δ1 < δ2, it follows that:
π2(j) < π1(j) < 0,∀j<j R
1 .
Thus all traders submit a market order when they face a spread which is smaller than or equal
to patient traders’ reservation spread. This implies that T(1) = T(2) = ... = T(jR
1 )=1
λ.N o w
47suppose a patient trader faces a spread of size jR
1 +1. Lemma 3 implies that he will either submit
a jR
1 - limit order or a market order. He obtains a larger payoﬀ with a jR
1 -limit order since
π1(jR
1 )=jR
1 ∆ − T(jR





where the last inequality follows from the deﬁnition of jR
1 . Then we deduce from Lemma 3 that
the patient type submits limit orders for all spreads s ∈ hjR
1 +1 ,Ki.A sf o rt h ei m p a t i e n tt y p e
there are two cases:
Case 1: The impatient type submits a market order for each s ∈ hjR
1 +1 ,Ki in which case
we set sc = K.
Case 2: There are spreads in h1,Ki for which the impatient type submits limit orders. In
this case let sc be the smallest spread that an impatient trader creates with a limit order. By
deﬁnition of sc, the impatient trader submits a market order when he faces a spread s ∈ h1,s ci
and a sc-limit order when he faces a spread of size sc +1 . Then we deduce from Lemma 3 that
impatient traders submit a limit order when they face a spread in hsc+1,Ki and a market order
otherwise. Finally it cannot be optimal for an impatient trader to submit a limit order which
creates a spread smaller than his reservation spread. This implies sc ≥ jR
2 .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Since we assume that sc = K the impatient type always submits market orders. From
Proposition 2, a patient trader submits a market order when he faces a spread in h1,jR
1 i and a
jR
1 -limit order when he faces a spread of size jR
1 +1. Repeated application of Lemma 3 shows the
existence of spreads n1 <n 2 <. . .<n q such that facing a spread in hnh +1 ,n h+1i the patient
trader submits an nh-limit order for h =1 ,...,q− 1.C l e a r l y ,n1 = jR
1 and nq = K.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
When they observe a spread of size n1, all the traders submit a market order. Therefore
T(n1)=1
λ.L e t h ∈ {2,...,q}. Suppose that the posted spread is s ∈ hnh−1 +1 ,n hi.W h e n
he observes this spread, a patient trader submits an nh−1-limit order and an impatient trader
submits a market order (Proposition 3). Therefore when the posted spread is s ∈ hnh−1 +1,n hi,










,∀s ∈ hnh−1 +1 ,n hi. (17)
48Hence, T(·) is constant for all s ∈ hnh−1 +1 ,n hi. Using Equation (17), we obtain
T(nh+1) − T(nh)=r(T(nh) − T(nh−1)) for h≥ 2, (18)
Furthermore, using Equation(17) and the fact that T(n1)=1





The claim follows now by repetitive application of Equation (18) and the fact that T(n1)=1
λ.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
Since nh = nh−1 + Ψh, we immediately get that nh = n1 +
Ph
k=2 Ψk. Furthermore, since
nq = K, i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tq is the smallest integer such that n1 +
Pq
k=2 Ψk ≥ K.T h e
expression for Ψh follows from Equation (8).
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1
Recall that q is the smallest integer such that n1 +
Pq
k=2 Ψk ≥ K.I t f o l l o w s t h a t q (a)
decreases with θ and δ1 and (b) increases with λ since Ψk increases with θ and δ1 and decreases
with λ, for all k ∈ {1,...,q− 1}. The result is then immediate.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
We ﬁrst show that the Markov chain given by W is (a) irreducible and (b) a-periodic.
The Markov chain is irreducible. O b s e r v et h a tg i v e na n yt w os t a t e sj1,j 2 with 1 ≤ j1 <
j2 ≤ q there is a positive probability that the chain will move from j1 to j2 after a suﬃciently large
(though ﬁnite) number of transitions. This implies that any two states in the chain communicate;
hence the chain is irreducible.
The Markov chain is a-periodic. Notice that Wq,q =1− θ > 0. This means that when
the chain is in state q, there is a probability equal to (1−θ)m that it will stay in this state for the
next m transitions, ∀m ≥ 1. Since state q communicates with all the other states of the chain, it
follows that no state has a period greater than 1. Thus the chain is a-periodic.
These properties imply that the Markov chain is ergodic. Being ergodic, the induced Markov
chain yields a unique stationary distribution of spreads (see Feller 1968). Let u =( u1,...,u q)
denote the row vector of stationary probabilities. The stationary probability distribution is
obtained by solving q +1linear equations given by:
uW = u and uε =1 , (19)
49where ε stands for the unit column vector. It is straightforward to verify that the probabilities
given by Equation (10) and Equation (11) are a solution of this system of equations.
Proof of Corollary 2.
The proof follows immediately from the arguments in the text.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
Step 1. We ﬁrst derive the expected waiting time function associated with the order place-
ment strategies described in Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the proposition. All traders submit a market order
when they face a spread equal to nm
1 . It follows that T(nm
1 )=1
λ. Now suppose that the posted
spread is sm ∈ (nm
h−1,n m
h ] with h ≥ 2. When he observes this spread, a patient trader submits
an nm
h−1-limit order and an impatient trader submits a market order. Therefore α0(sm)=1− θ





















,∀sm ∈ (nh−1,n h] for h ≥ 2.
Hence T(·) is constant for all sm ∈ (nm
h−1,n m
h ] with h ≥ 2. Following the last part of the proof of











∀ h =2 ,...,q 0 − 1.
This proves the last part of the proposition.
Step 2. Now we show that the order placement strategies described in Parts 1, 2 and 3 of
the proposition constitute an equilibrium given the expression of the waiting time function given





h ) − T(nm




h )δ1 = nm
h−1 − T(nm
h−1)δ1 = ... = nm
1 − T(nm
1 )δ1 for h =2 ,...q 0 − 1. (20)
Furthermore, the expression of T(·) is such that:
T(jm)=T(nm
h ) for jm ∈ (nm
h−1,n m
h ] and h =1 ,...,q 0,
50which implies that
jm − T(jm)δi <n m
h − T(nm
h )δi for jm ∈ (nm
h−1,n m
h ) and i ∈ {1,2}. (21)
Consider a patient trader facing an nm
h -spread, h ∈ {2,...,q 0}. From Equations (20) and (21),











λ,w eh a v e
nm
1 − T(nm
1 )δ1 =0 . (22)
It follows from Equation (21) that the patient trader cannot proﬁtably improve upon nm
1 .I nt h i s
case he chooses a market order. Furthermore, Equations (20) and (22) imply that:
nm
h − T(nm
h )δ1 =0 for h =1 ,...q 0 − 1.
Therefore, as δ1 < δ2, we have
nm
h − T(nm
h )δ2 < 0 for h =1 ,...q 0 − 1.
Using Equation (21), we deduce that
jm − T(jm)δ2 < 0 ∀jm > 0.
It follows that impatient traders never submit limit orders.
Step 3. Finally, we compute the expression for q0.S i n c enm
h = nm
h−1 +Ψm






k . Furthermore since nq0 = Km, it must be the case that q0 is the
smallest integer such that nm
1 +
Pq0
k=2 Ψk ≥ Km.A s Ψm
k =
(2rk−1)δ1
λ , we deduce that q0 is the


























if r =1 .
(24)
There is no ﬁnite solution if r<r c.U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of rc and the fact that Km > δ1
λ ,i ti s
straightforward to check that q0 ≥ 2. This achieves the proof of Proposition 6.
51Proof of Corollary 3.
















for 1 ≤ k ≤ Min{q0 − 2,q ∆ − 2}.T h u si fnm
k (0) <n m
k (∆) then nm
k+1(0) <n m
k+1(∆) for 1 ≤ k ≤













1 (0) <n m






. We deduce that nm
k (0) <n m
k (∆) for k ≤ Min{q0 −
1,q ∆ − 1}. Recall that q0 and q∆ are the smallest integers such that:
nq0−1(0) + 2rq0−1δ1
λ






∆ ≥ K∆ = Km
Since nm
q0−1(0) <n q∆−1∆, we deduce that q∆ ≤ q0.T h u sw eh a v ep r o v e dP a r t s1a n d2o ft h e
corollary. The last part is obvious since nm
q∆(∆)=K∆ = Km = nm
q0(0).
Proof of Corollary 4.
Recall that we measure resiliency by R = θq−1.A sr = θ
1−θ, we can also write this measure
in function of r: R =( r
1+r)q−1.L e tR(∆,r) be the value of this measure for a given tick size, ∆
and a given value of the ratio r. In Corollary 3, we have shown that q∆ ≤ q0. We deduce that
R(∆,r) ≥ R(0,r). Using the expression for q0 given in Equation (24) (see proof of Proposition
6) it is readily shown that limr−→rc q0 = ∞.I tf o l l o w st h a tlimr−→rc R(0,r)=0 .W h e n∆ > 0,
the number of spreads on the equilibrium path cannot be larger than K,t h a ti sq∆ <K .W e
deduce that R(∆,r) > ( r
1+r)K−1 > 0 for ∆ > 0.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y5
The second part follows from Corollary 1. In the proof of this corollary we have established






, for λ ∈ {λS,λF} and k ≤ qλS − 2.
52Thus, if nk(λF) ≤ nk(λS), then nk+1(λF) ≤ nk+1(λS) for k ≤ qλS − 2.N o w , o b s e r v e t h a t f o r







We deduce that n1(λF) ≤ n1(λS), and conclude that nk(λF) ≤ nk(λS) for k ≤ qλS −1.F u r t h e r -
more, nqλS(λS)=nqλF (λF)=K.C o n s e q u e n t l y , nk(λF) ≤ nqλS(λS) for qλS ≤ k ≤ qλF.T h i s
proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y6
Let ˜ Nh denote the random variable describing the number of trader arrivals between two
consecutive transactions, conditional on the event that the ﬁrst transaction took place when the
spread was nh. Similarly, denote by ˜ N the random variable describing the number of trader





since the expected waiting time between two order arrivals is 1










vhE( e Nh), (25)
where vh is the probability that the last transaction took place while the spread was nh.W e
proceed in two steps. First, we compute E( e Nh), and second, we compute vh, for h =1 ,...,qand
E( e N).
Step 1.
Suppose that the last transaction took place at the smallest possible spread, n1. Following
this transaction, the new spread in equilibrium is n2. If the next trader is an impatient trader
then a new transaction takes place and N1 =1 . If the next trader is a patient trader, he submits
a limit order which creates a spread equal to n1. Then the next order is a market order since all
traders submit market orders when the spread is n1.I nt h i sc a s eN1 =2 . We deduce that the
probability distribution for e N1 is :
Pr(N1 =1 )=( 1− θ) and Pr(N1 =2 )=θ.
53M o r eg e n e r a l l y ,t h es a m et y p eo fr e a s o n i n gyields the probability distribution for e Nh when 1 ≤
h<q . The largest possible value for e Nh is h +1and
Pr(Nh = j)=( 1− θ)θj−1 for j =1 ,...,h,
and
Pr(Nh = h +1 )=θh.
We deduce that
E( e Nh)=( 1− θ)
h X
j=1





,for 1 ≤ h<q . (26)
Finally, observe that when the last transaction takes place at the largest possible spread, nq then
the spread following this transaction remains nq. Hence the situation is as if the last transaction
took place at spread, nq−1. It follows that the probability distributions of e Nq and e Nq−1 are
identical. Therefore E( e Nq)=E( e Nq−1).
Step 2.





Pr(I =1| s = nh)uh.
If s = n1 then a transaction takes place with probability 1. For larger spreads a transaction




(1 − θ)uh + u1.
By Bayes rule:
vh =P r ( s = nh | I =1 )=





(1 − θ)uh Pq
h=2(1 − θ)uh + u1.




h=2(1 − θ)uh + u1
.




i=1 θq−i(1 − θ)i−1 h =1 ,...,q. (27)
The expression for ¯ D follows by substitution of Equation (27) in Equation (25).
Proof of Corollary 7.






.T h u sw h e nr<1, Ψh decreases with h and when r>1, Ψh increases with
h. This means that when r<1, spread improvements are inversely related to the inside spreads
on the equilibrium path. In contrast, when r>1, spread improvements are positively related to
the inside spreads on the equilibrium path.
9 Appendix B - Robustness Results
In this Appendix we check the robustness results, relaxing assumptions A.2, and A.3 separately.
9.1 Queueing
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7
We maintain A.1 and A.3 but we allow traders to queue at the best quotes. Assume that
traders follow the same trading strategies as in the equilibrium in which they are not allowed to
queue (i.e. the equilibrium is as described in Propositions 3,4,5). We identify below a condition
under which these strategies still form an equilibrium when traders are allowed to queue at the
inside quotes.
Consider a patient trader who faces a spread equal to nh. If he improves upon the inside
quotes, he optimally chooses a limit order which creates a spread equal to nh−1. Hence, we only
need to ﬁnd a condition under which this trader is better oﬀ improving the price, rather than
queuing at the best quotes.
Let T(nh,2) be the expected waiting time of the trader if he decides to queue by placing an
order at the inside quote. The trader is better oﬀ undercutting iﬀ
nh−1∆ − T(nh−1)δ1 ≥ nh∆ − T(nh,2)δ1, ∀ h ≥ 1,
55or
(nh − nh−1)∆ ≤ [T(nh,2) − T(nh−1)]δ1 ∀ h ≥ 1. (28)
We now identify a suﬃcient condition under which this no queuing condition holds. We ﬁrst
derive a lower bound for T(nh,2). Suppose that the trader who decides to queue is a buyer (call
him B2). Observe that this buyer cannot be executed before the buyer who is posting the best
bid price when the spread is nh (call him B1). The expected waiting time of B1 is equal to
T(nh). When B1’s order executes, B2 acquires price priority and as buyers and sellers alternate,
the next trader is a buyer. Thus from the moment B1’s order is executed, it takes at least two
periods for B2’s limit order to execute. It takes exactly two periods if and only if the next two
traders are impatient. Otherwise, it takes more than 4 periods for B2’s order to be executed. We
conclude that
T(nh,2) ≥ T(nh)+( 1− θ)2(
2
λ












Substituting this lower bound for T(nh,2) into the no-queuing condition (28) we obtain:
(nh − nh−1)∆ ≤ (T(nh) − T(nh−1))δ1 +
2
λ
(1 + θ(1 − θ))δ1 ∀ h ≥ 1,
or
(nh − nh−1)∆ − (T(nh) − T(nh−1))δ1 ≤
2
λ
(1 + θ(1 − θ))δ1 ∀ h ≥ 1. (30)
Recall that in equilibrium:











(1 + θ(1 − θ))δ1
is a suﬃcient condition for queuing to be suboptimal.
9.2 The Alternating Arrival Assumption
9.2.1 Framework
We maintain assumptions A.1 and A.2 but relax assumption A.3: we assume that each arrival
is either a buyer or a seller with equal probabilities. Suppose that K =4 . In this case, there
56are 3 possible prices in the range [B,A] which can be chosen by limit order submitters. Hence
t h es t a t eo ft h el i m i to r d e rb o o kc a nb ed e s c r i b e db yat r i p l e t(x1,x 2,x 3) where xi indicates (1)
whether a limit order is posted at price B +i∆ or not and (2) the nature of the limit order (buy
or sell) posted at price B + i∆.H e n c exi belongs to the set {b,s,n} where “b”( “ s”) stands for
“buy” (“sell”) limit order and “n” stands for “no order” (an empty cell). For instance, (b,n,s)
is a limit order book in which (i) one buy limit order is posted at price B + ∆, (ii) no order is
posted at price B +2 ∆ and (iii) one sell limit order is posted at price B +3 ∆.T h es i z eo ft h e
bid ask spread in this book is 2 ticks. Let Ti
x1x2x3 denote the expected waiting time of the limit
order posted at a price equal to B + i∆ when the state of the book is (x1,x 2,x 3),j u s ta f t e rt h e
last arrival. For example: T1
bnn is the expected waiting time of a buy limit order posted at B+∆
right after the arrival of an order. Another example: T3
bss is the expected waiting time of the sell
limit order posted at B +3 ∆ when the state of the limit order book is (b,s,s).
To ascertain that the waiting time function is not recursive consider the following example.
Suppose the current state of the book is (n,s,n). A buyer arrives in the market and submits a
limit order at price B+∆. Then the state of the book becomes (b,s,n), and the buyer’s expected
waiting time is T1
bsn. The bid ask spread in the book (b,s,n) is one tick, hence the next trader
must submit a market order. This next trader is a buyer or a seller with equal probabilities. If
the next trader is a seller, then our buyer’s limit order is cleared. If the next trader is a buyer,
the state of the book becomes (b,n,n) and our original buyer has additional expected waiting
time of T1










Thus, the expected waiting time of a limit order creating a spread of 1 tick depends on the
expected waiting time of this limit order when the book has a spread of three ticks. This means
that the waiting time function does not have a recursive structure and it precludes the solution
method that we employed in our original model. Furthermore, the waiting time is a function of
the entire structure of the limit order book, not simply the spread. Indeed, in general T1
bsn 6= T1
bss
although both books have a bid-ask spread of 1 tick.31
As we cannot solve the game by backward induction, it becomes impossible to solve the model
in general. In the next section, we present 3 examples which show that the main results of our
model are still obtained when buyers and sellers arrive randomly. There are two properties which
31For instance, in Example 5 below, T
1
bsn =7 .37 whereas T
1
bss =6 .17
57simplify the computations, that we present now. As traders must submit price improving orders













Furthermore, as traders can be buyers or sellers with equal probabilities, waiting times for




Example 4 - The Homogeneous Case (a strongly resilient book)
One might suspect that the oscillating equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is an artifact
of the alternating arrival assumption. The following example shows that it is not. Set K =4 ,
∆ =0 .125, λ =1 , δ
def
= δ1 = δ2 =0 .05 (we denote the common waiting cost by δ). Now we show
that the following order placement strategy forms an equilibrium: (i) when the spread is larger
than 1 tick, buyers and sellers submit a 1-limit order and (ii) when the spread is equal to 1 tick,
both submit a market order.
We proceed as follows. In the ﬁrst step we compute the expected waiting times associated
with the previous order placement strategy for each limit order in each possible state of the book.
In a second step we check that the order placement strategy is optimal given the expected waiting
times computed in the ﬁrst step.
Step 1.
First, we compute T3
nnb. When the state of the book is (n,n,b), the spread is equal to 1 tick.
Hence the next trader must submit a market order. If the next trader is a seller, the buy limit
order at B+3∆ will be cleared. If the next trader is a buyer, the state of the book is unchanged.
It follows that:
T3







nnb =2 . Using Equation (31), we deduce that that: T3
bbb = T3
nbb = T3






58Next, we compute T2
bbn. When the state of the book is (b,b,n), the spread is equal to 2 ticks.
Therefore, according to the conjectured equilibrium strategy, the next trader will submit a 1-limit
order. With probability 0.5 the next trader is a buyer and the state of the book becomes (b,b,b).














The same type of reasoning yields :
T2


















Solving the system of equations (34), (35), (36) yields: T2
bbn =1 0 . Using equation (32), we
deduce that T2
nbn =1 0 . Also by symmetry: T2
nss = T2
nsn =1 0 . Finally we calculate T1
bnn.U s i n g
































Solving these equations yields: T1
bnn =1 0and by symmetry: T3
nns =1 0 .
Step 2. Now we check that traders’ order placement strategy is optimal given the expected
waiting times computed in step 1. For instance consider a trader (say a buyer) who arrives
when the state of the book is (n,n,n). He has three options. If he submits a 3-limit order his
payoﬀ is: 3∆ − δT1
bnn =0 .375 − 0.05 · 10 = −0.125. If he submits a 2-limit order his payoﬀ
is 2∆ − δT2
nbn =0 .25 − 0.05 · 10 = −0.25. If the trader submits a 1-limit order his payoﬀ is
∆−δT3
nnb =0 .125−0.05 ·2=0 .025. It follows that the optimal strategy of the trader when the
spread is equal to 4 ticks is to submit a 1-limit order as conjectured. We can proceed in the same
way to show that the conjectured order placement strategy when the trader faces other states of
the book is optimal. Thus, similar to our baseline model we obtain an oscillating equilibrium.
The spread is either 4 ticks or 1 tick. The resiliency of the book is equal to 1, as all transactions
are performed when the tick size is 1, and the spread reverts to this competitive spread with
certainty after each deviation.
Example 5 - A Resilient Book (heterogenous traders, high θ)
59Set: ∆ =0 .125, K =4 , θ =0 .7, λ =1 , δ1 =0 .02,a n dδ2 =0 .1. We show that the following
order placement strategy forms an equilibrium. First, an impatient trader always submits a
market order. Second, a patient trader submits (i) a 2-limit order when the spread is equal to 3
or 4 ticks, (ii) a 1-limit order when the spread is equal to 2 ticks and (iii) a market order when
the spread is equal to 1 tick. We proceed in 2 steps as in Example 4.
Step 1. As in Example 4, using the conjectured equilibrium strategies we can determine
the expected waiting times of each limit order in each possible state of the book. This requires
solving a number of systems of linear equations. We do not report the computations here to save
space.32 Solving these equations yields the following expected waiting times:
T3
bbb = T1
sss =2 ; T2
bbn = T2
nss =6 .31; T2
bbb = T2
sss =8 .3 (37)
T2
bbs = T2
bss =4 .15; T1
bnn = T3
nns =1 2 .74; T1
bbn = T3
nss =1 7 .76
T1
bbb = T3
sss =1 9 .76; T1
bns = T3
bns =1 0 .34; T1
bbs = T3
bss =1 6 .07
T1
bss = T3
bbs =6 .17; T1
bsn = T3
nbs =7 .37.
Step 2. Using these expressions for the expected waiting times, we can check that the
conjectured order placement strategy is optimal for each type of trader. For instance consider
a patient trader (say a buyer) who arrives when the state of the book is (n,n,n). He has three
options. If he submits a 3-limit order his payoﬀ is: 3∆−δ1T1
bnn =0 .375−0.02·12.74 = 0.1202.I f
he submits a 2-limit order his payoﬀ is 2∆−δ1T2
nbn =2 ∆−δ1T2
bbn =0 .25−0.02·6.31 = 0.1238.I f
the trader submits a 1-limit order his payoﬀ is ∆−δ1T3
nnb = ∆−δ1T3
bbb =0 .125−0.02·2=0 .08.
It follows that the optimal strategy of a patient trader when the spread is equal to 4 ticks is to
submit a 2-limit order as conjectured. Thus, given the high proportion of patient traders they
ﬁnd it optimal to act aggressively and improve the current spread by more than one tick similar to
what we have in our base model when buyers and sellers alternate. Notice that when the spread
is equal to 4 ticks, it takes a string of 2 patient traders to bring the spread to the competitive
level (1 tick here). Thus the resiliency of the book is R =0 .72 =0 .49. Table 7 describes the
order posted by a trader according to his type in each possible state of the book.
Example 6 - A Weakly Resilient Book (heterogenous traders, low θ)
Set: ∆ =0 .125, K =4 , θ =0 .3, λ =1 , δ1 =0 .02,a n dδ2 =0 .1. We show that the following
32As K =4 , the maximal number of simultaneous equations required to solve in this case is: K(K +1 ) /2=1 0 .
A detailed solution is available upon request from the authors.
60order placement strategies constitute an equilibrium. An impatient trader always submits a
market order. A patient trader submits (i) a limit order reducing the current spread by one tick,
provided that the current spread is larger than one tick, and (ii) a market order when the spread
is equal to one tick.
Step 1. As in Example 4, using the conjectured equilibrium strategies we can determine the
expected waiting times of each limit order in each possible state of the book. We obtain:
T3
bbb = T1
sss =2 ; T2
bbn = T2
nss =3 .41; T2
bbb = T2
sss =5 .41 (38)
T2
bbs = T2
bss =2 .706; T1
bnn = T3





sss =9 .55; T1
bns = T3






Step 2. Using these expressions for the expected waiting times, we can check that the
conjectured order placement strategy is optimal for each type of trader. For instance consider
a patient trader (say a buyer) who arrives when the state of the book is (n,n,n). He has three
options. If he submits a 3-limit order his payoﬀ is: 3∆ − δ1T1
bnn =0 .375 − 0.02 · 4.185 = 0.29.I f
he submits a 2-limit order his payoﬀ is 2∆−δ1T2
nbn =2 ∆−δ1T2
bbn =0 .25−0.02·3.41 = 0.1818.I f
the trader submits a 1-limit order his payoﬀ is ∆−δ1T3
nnb = ∆−δ1T3
bbb =0 .125−0.02·2=0 .08.
It follows that the optimal strategy of the trader when the spread is equal to 4 ticks is to submit a
3-limit order as conjectured. Thus, as in our base model, given the low level of θ, patient traders
do not act aggressively, and improve the spread by no more than one tick size. Notice that when
the spread is equal to 4 ticks, it takes a string of 3 patient traders to bring the spread to the
competitive level (1 tick here). Thus the resiliency of the book is R =0 .33 =0 .027.T a b l e 7
describes the order posted by a trader according to his type in each possible state of the book.
9.2.3 Distribution of Spreads
As in our baseline model, the possible states of the limit order book on the equilibrium path
form a Markov chain. We can compute the stationary probability distribution of this Markov
chain and deduce the stationary distribution of the spread (by grouping all the states of the book
with the same spread). The stationary distributions of spreads for the equilibrium described in
61Examples 5 and 6 are given in Table 8.33 Observe that, as in the baseline model, the distribution
of spreads in Example 5 (large proportion of patient traders) is skewed towards small spreads,
while in Example 6 (small proportion of patient traders) it is skewed towards large spreads. It
follows that the expected spread is smaller in Example 5 than in Example 6 (1.76 ticks vs. 3
ticks). Again this is as in the model in which buyers and sellers alternate.
Table 7 - Equilibrium Strategies in Examples 5 and 6
B1=Patient Buyer, S1=Patient Seller, B2=Impatient Buyer, S2=Impatient Seller
Strategies - Ex. 5 Strategies - Ex. 6
b o o k s t a t u ss p r e a d ( t i c k s )B 1S 1B 2S 2 B 1S 1B 2S 2
(b,b,b) 1 0000 0000
(s,s,s) 1 0000 0000
(b,s,s) 1 0000 0000
(b,b,s) 1 0000 0000
(n,b,s) 1 0000 0000
(b,s,n) 1 0000 0000
(n,b,b) 1 0000 0000
(s,s,n) 1 0000 0000
(b,b,n) 2 1100 1100
(n,s,s) 2 1100 1100
(n,b,n) 2 1100 1100
(n,s,n) 2 1100 1100
(b,n,s) 2 1100 1100
(b,n,n) 3 2200 2200
(n,n,s) 3 2200 2200
(n,n,n) 4 2200 3300
33Detailed calculations of these distributions are available from the authors upon request. As there are 16 possible
states of the book the calculation requires a solution of 16 simultaneous linear equations.
62Table 8 - Spread Distribution
Spread Probability
size Example 5 Example 6
1 0.42 0.08
2 0.44 0.21
3 0.10 0.33
4 0.04 0.38
63